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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF REVIEW:
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Metro Broadcastingv. FCC,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, few issues have been so frequent and controversial a subject of
legal and public policy debate as affirmative action programs conferring benefits
to persons based upon their status as members of minority groups. After the October 1988 Term United States Supreme Court decisions of City ofRichmond v. J. A.
Croson' and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio,2 many commentators believed
that a conservative majority had formed on the Court with regard to affirmative
action and employment discrimination issues. However, in the October 1989
Term, the Court not only upheld an affirmative action program, but rendered its
most far reaching decision to date in Metro Broadcastingv. FCC.3 Part II of this
note will explain the background of the two cases consolidated to address the two
primary features of the FCC's minority ownership policy. Part III will demonstrate the Court's struggle to establish a standard by which to review equal protection challenges to affirmative action programs by reviewing the prior cases on this
issue and will also provide information on the background of the FCC programs in
question. Part IV will look specifically at both the majority and dissenting opinions in Metro Broadcasting. Finally, Part V will compare and contrast the Metro
Broadcastingdecision with prior decisions and attempt to determine the future impact of the decision in light of Justice Brennan's retirement from the Court.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1978, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued its Statement
of Policy on Minority Ownership of BroadcastFacilities.4 The statement announced
three policies the FCC would employ in an effort to increase minority ownership
of broadcast facilities. First, the FCC would award an "enhancement" in the comparative hearing process awarding new broadcast licenses to groups with "significant minority ownership interests."' Second, the FCC would allow a current
licensee whose qualifications had come into question to transfer his interest in a

1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny and disallowing a minority set aside program instituted by
the city of Richmond which required 30 percent of the city's construction contracts to be reserved for Minority
Business Enterprises). See also infra notes 200-58 and accompanying text.
2. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that the plaintiffs establishment of a prima facia case in a Title VII disparate impact action does not shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant employer, but only the burden of production). For a complete analysis of Wards Cove, see Note, Hurdling New Procedural Guidelines in Disparate
Impact Cases, 10 Miss. C. L. REv. 211 (1990).
3. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
4. 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978).
5. Id. at 982.
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"distress sale" to minority controlled ownership groups.' Finally, the FCC would
grant a tax certificate allowing current owners of broadcast licenses to receive deferred capital gains treatment of proceeds from a sale of their interest to a minority
ownership group.
In the first case consolidated for hearing by the Supreme Court, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. challenged the minority enhancement awarded in the comparative
hearing process.' Metro Broadcasting had engaged in the comparative hearing
process seeking to obtain a license to construct and operate a new television station
in Orlando, Florida.' One of the other groups seeking to be awarded the licenses
in the mutually exclusive proceeding was the 90 percent Hispanic-owned Rainbow Broadcasting. 10 An administrative law judge conducting an evidentiary hearing disqualified Rainbow based upon his finding that its application contained
"misrepresentations" and awarded the license to Metro based upon the local residence of its ownership. 1 However, the FCC's review board disagreed with the
judge's findings and determined that Rainbow's application had not failed to exhibit candor and awarded Rainbow an enhancement based on its minority ownership interest. 12 The enhancement given to Rainbow outweighed Metro's local
ownership credits and it was awarded the license.13 Metro then sought review in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.14 A
panel1" of the appeals court held that the minority16enhancement was not violative
of fifth amendment equal protection guarantees.
The second of the cases consolidated for appeal was Shurberg Broadcastingof
Hartford,Inc. v. FCC.17 The controversy in Shurberg involved the FCC's "distress
sale" policy.1 In 1980, the FCC designated a hearing for the renewal application
of Faith Center, Inc., the current licensee of Channel 18 in Hartford, Connecti-

6. Id.at 983.
7. Id. at 982-83. The validity of the tax certificate was not at issue in Metro Broadcasting. For an analysis of
the tax certificate policy, see Wilde, FCC Tax CertificatesforMinority Ownership of BroadcastFacilities:A Critical Re-examination of Policy, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 979 (1990).
8. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3005.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.at 3005-06.
14. Id.at 3006.
15. The three judge panel consisted of Edwards and Williams, Circuit Judges, and Friedman, Circuit Court
for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873
F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
16. Id.Winter Park Communications, Inc., another participant in the comparative hearing for the award of
the Orlando license, also sought review in the appeals court. Its claim was consolidated with Metro's at the appeals court level but it did not seek certiorari to the Supreme Court.
17. 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
18. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3007.
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cut. 19 The qualifications of Faith Center having come into question,2" the broadcaster sought permission to execute a distress sale to Television Corporation of
Hartford, a minority controlled ownership group.2" Faith Center was unable to
consummate this sale and in 1982 attempted a second distress sale to Interstate
Media Corporation.22 When this attempted distress sale was also unsuccessful,
Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. filed a construction application in 1983
for a new station to be considered with, and which was mutually exclusive of,
Faith Center's renewal application.23 Before the hearing, Faith Center sought permission for a third attempt to execute a distress sale, this time to Astroline Communications Company Limited Partnership.24 Alan Shurberg, the sole owner of
Shurberg Broadcasting, acting in his individual capacity,25 objected to the distress
sale claiming that the distress sale violated his right to equal protection.26 The
FCC dismissed Shurberg's equal protection claims as "without merit"27 and giving
greater weight to its distress sale policy than the policy favoring comparative hearings, granted Faith Center's request to attempt a third distress sale which was this
time successfully executed. 28
Shurberg then appealed the FCC's order to the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals.29 Briefs were submitted and oral arguments heard, but the disposition of the case was delayed because of the FCC's own inquiry into its minority ownership policies in light of the District of Columbia Appeals Court decision
in Steele v. FCC,3" which held the FCC did not have statutory authority to grant
comparative hearing enhancements to female owners.31 Before the FCC could
complete the inquiry, Congress passed and the President signed a continuing resolution providing the federal government's appropriation for the fiscal year 1988,32

19. Id.
20. The questioning of Faith Center's qualifications arose as a result of fraud allegations against its San
Bernardino, California station with respect to over-the-air solicitation of funds and its failure to cooperate with
an FCC investigation. Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 904. Faith Center's failure to cooperate led an administrative law
judge to refuse to grant a renewal of its license, a decision which was affirmed by the FCC and the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. See also Faith Center, Inc., 82 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980), reconsid. denied,
FCC 81-235 (1981), affd mem., Faith Center, Inc. v. FCC, 679 F.2d 261 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203
(1983). The application for renewal involving Faith Center's Hartford, Connecticut station was originally made
in 1977 but had been delayed pending the outcome of the investigation of its San Bernardino, California station.
Shurberg, 876 F2d at 905.
21. Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 905. See also Faith Center,Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d 788 (1981).
22. Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 905.
23. Id. at 903.
24. Id.
25. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3007 n. 10.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Faith Center, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 1164, 1171 (1984)).
28. Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 903 (citing Faith Center,Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 1164, 1170 (1984)).
29. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3007.
30. 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
31. Id. See also Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3006 n.8. The FCC review board adopted an enhancement
similar, but of less weight, to be awarded to ownership groups with significant female involvement in Mid-Florida
Television Corp., 69 FC.C.2d 607 (Rev. Bd. 1978).
32. Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987).
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which contained a provision prohibiting the FCC from spending any of its appropriation for a reexamination of its minority and female ownership policies. 3 The
District of Columbia Circuit then rendered an opinion holding that the distress sale
policy violated Shurberg's right to equal protection under the fifth amendment. 4
After petitions for rehearing en bane were denied, Shurberg petitioned the Supreme Court which granted certiorari."
III.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court first indicated that government classifications based on
race may call for greater scrutiny in United States v. Carolene Products.6 In Brown
v. Board ofEducation, " the Court revived the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amemdment by eliminating the doctrine of "separate but equal" 38 and replacing it with the concept that the government should not distinguish among its
citizens on the basis of race. 39 The Court expressly declared in Boiling v. Sharpe4"
that classifications which would violate fourteenth amendment41 equal protection
guarantees would violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment 2 when the
classification is promulgated by the federal government.' These cases which
served to eliminate burdens imposed by law on minorities, now provide the basis
for challenges alleging "reverse discrimination" because, although Titles VI and
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act" retain vitality with regard to affirmative action
challenges in the employment context, the equal protection clause is the context in

33. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3007.
34. Shurburg Broadcasting,878 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
35. 110 S.Ct. 715 (1990).
36. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Although a government classification based on race was not an issue in the case,
Justice Stone in a footnote stated that "statutes directed at . . . discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition . . .call[ing] for a . . .more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 152 n.4.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-22 at 1526 (2d ed. 1988). Although the holding of
Brown was limited to segregation in schools, Professor Tribe believes that its legacy has been to "create a general
right never to be disadvantaged by law on account of one's race -or perhaps to be so disadvantaged only upon a
showing of the strictest national necessity." Id.
40. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
43. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n. 16
(1987) (plurality opinion); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
638, n.2 (1975).
44. Codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). For example, Alan Bakke, challenging an
admissions program to the medical school at the University of California at Davis, alleged the program violated
Title VI. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also infra
notes 53-57,
81-87 and accompanying text. The Court has also heard several cases arising under Title VII. See e.g., Johnson
v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding minority and gender based program seeking to obtain work
force reflective of local labor pool); Local No. 93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501 (1986) (upholding minority promotion plan); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding program granting reservation for blacks of positions in skilled training programs until percentage of
skilled black workers was equivalent to the percentage of blacks in the local labor force). For an analysis of the
Court's different approach under the Civil Rights Act and the Constitution, see Comment, The Supreme Court's
Review of Voluntary Affirmative Action by PublicEmployers: Applying Different Standards Under Title VII and the
Constitution, 26 WILLAMETTE L. Rv.957 (1990).
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which the cases are fought whenever a governmental body chooses to employ racial classifications as a means of achieving a policy objective.
Determining what will constitute a denial of equal protection in the context of
affirmative action programs is often a difficult process. Although the area of law
prior to Metro Broadcastingwas primarily controlled by only four adjudications,4"
a plethora of plurality opinions, coupled with a sharp division within the Court,
has prevented the emergence of a single, concise standard by which to judge a particular program. These cases have, however, afforded some insight into three of
the principal issues arising in affirmative action litigation: the level of review to be
applied, the qualitative and quantitative findings a governmental entity must make
before adopting such a program, and the characteristics of a program which will
lead the Court to declare it as violative of equal protection guarantees. Unlike
many areas of law however, and especially in light of Justice Brennan's retirement,
it does not suffice to speak in terms of "the Court," instead, only a detailed examination of the many opinions rendered by the Justices will suffice to provide this
insight.
A. Bakke: Defining the Issues
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,4 6 the first case47 alleging "reverse discrimination" adjudicated by the Supreme Court on its merits, deserves
significant attention because it not only established the framework of the legal debate, but also revealed the sharp division among the Justices on affirmative action
issues. The medical school of the University of California at Davis had instituted
a special admissions program designed to increase the number of "disadvantaged"
minorities gaining entrance to the school and which was to operate separately from
the regular admissions process.' The program set aside for those who qualified
for the special admissions program sixteen of the 100 available seats in the entering class, thus preventing the necessity of their competing with those seeking admission under the ordinary admissions process. 4"
Allan Bakke, a white male, applied for admission to the medical school in both
1973 and 1974." Despite having academic credentials superior to those admitted
under the special admissions program, Bakke was, in each year, denied admission

45. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). A
Jewish group presented a fourteenth amendment challenge to a legislative reapportionment plan establishing
black majority in several voting districts pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439,
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). The case was primarily decided in the context of the Voting
Rights Act and its limited fourteenth amendment analysis is inapposite to the Court's subsequent consideration of
"benign" race conscious classifications.
46. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
47. The Court had been presented with a similar case involving a law student but dismissed it as being moot.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
48. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-73.
49. Id. at 272-75.
50. Id. at 276.
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to the school."1 Following the second denial of admission, Bakke brought suit in
the Superior Court of California seeking a declaratory judgement that the admissions program violated his rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 and section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Sa
and seeking a court order that he be admitted to the medical school." The Superior Court and later the California Supreme Court found in favor of Bakke."5 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The six separate opinions rendered by the Justices began a period in which the Court has struggled to form a discernible standard by which to judge challenges to affirmative
action programs.
The judgment of the Court was announced by Justice Powell in an opinion, the
rationale of which, was joined by other Justices only to the extent that it concluded
race may be consideredas a factor in university admissions decisions.6 The opinion nevertheless deserves attention because it established the strict scrutiny analysis which is in many ways similar to that employed today by the Chief Justice and
Justice O'Connor. Justice Powell first addressed Bakke's claim under Title VI. 7
After a review of the legislative history, Justice Powell concluded that Title VI
"embodied Constitutional principles" and would only prohibit racial classifications which would violate the equal protection clause or the fifth amendment.5 8
Thus, the case only need be considered in light of the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Powell then proceeded to discuss the level of review to be applied when
considering a racial classification disadvantageous to whites. Although the University argued that a heightened standard of review was only warranted when the

51. Id. at 276-77. See also id. at 277 n.7 (comparing Bakke's undergraduate grade point average and MCAT
scores with the averages of those admitted under the special admissions program).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "[Nior shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
53.42 U.S.C. §2000d (1988). "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
54. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277-78.
55. Id. at 279-81. The Superior Court held that the California Constitution, Title VI, and the equal protection
clause did not allow the University to consider race as a factor in its admissions program, but refused to grant
Bakke admission to the medical school holding he had not met the burden of proving he would have gained admission if not for the existence of the special program. Id. at 279. The California Supreme Court applied strict
scrutiny and affirmed the trial court with regard to the permissibility of the admissions program, reaching only
the fourteenth amendment issue, but disagreed on the issue of Bakke's admittance to the school. Id. at 279-80.
The court ruled that because Bakke had proven discrimination on the basis of his race, the burden shifted to the
University to establish that Bakke would have failed to gain admission in the absence of the program. Id. at 280.
When the University conceded its inability to satisfy that burden, the court ordered that Bakke be admitted to the
school. Id. at 280-81.
56. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
57. Id. at 281-87.
58. Id. at 286-87. Justice Powell cited the statements of several ofthe Act's sponsors. The purpose of Title VI
is "to insure that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral sense of the Nation."
110 CoNG. REc. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). "Basically there is a constitutional restriction
against discrimination in the use of federal funds; and [T]itle VI simply spells out the procedure to be used in
enforcing that restriction." 110 CoNG. REC. at 13333 (remarks of Senator Ribicoff). Bakke, 438 U.S. at 286.
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classification is one which affects "discrete and insular minorities,""9 Justice Powell felt that the admissions program was nevertheless a classification based on
race."' Viewing the rights established by the fourteenth amendment as "personal
rights"61 that do not vary according to the race of the person claiming protection,
Justice Powell concluded that the admissions plan should be subject to strict scrutiny.62 Such a standard required that the government have a "substantial" purpose
or interest and that its imposition of a racial classification be necessary to achieving that purpose protecting its interest.6
Justice Powell then subjected the several purposes' set forth by the University
as justifications for the program to a strict scrutiny analysis." He concluded that
only the goal of attaining an ethnically diverse student body was a permissible goal
for the use of racial classifications by an educational institution.66 This conclusion
was based on the belief that academic freedom is a "special concern" of the first
amendment allowing the University to select students who would most contribute
to the "robust exchange of ideas."67
While Justice Powell was willing to accept the proposition that certain governmental interests were sufficiently compelling to warrant a governmental classification not completely disregarding of race, he was not, however, disposed to
accept the classification scheme employed by the University in setting aside a certain number of positions for which race was the sole criterion to be considered.8
Instead, "[tihe diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far
59. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288 (citing Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
60. Id. at 289.
61. Id. (quoting Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
62. Id. at 289-91.
63. Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)).
64. The University listed four purposes of the program to justify its Constitutional permissibility. Id. at 306.
First, the University stated the program would "reduc[e] the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities
in medical schools and in the medical profession." Id. (quoting Brief for the Petitioner at 32). Second, the program would "counter[] the effects of societal discrimination." Id. See also id. n.43. Third, "increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved." Id. Finally, the program would aid
in "obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body." Id.
65. Id. at 307-15.
66. Id. at 311-12. Addressing the first two of the University's justifications, Justice Powell concluded that
.societal discrimination [is] an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past," and
that "[w]e have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized
groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." Id. at 307. Absent such findings, "it cannot be said that the government has any greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from harming another" because
"societal discrimination does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons, like [Bakke],
who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to
have suffered." Id. at 308-10.
Concerning the University's claim that the admissions would increase the number of physicians serving disadvantaged communities, Justice Powell stated that the University had failed to prove any "significant" correlation
between the program and the improved delivery of health care to such communities. Instead, a more reliable
means of achieving such a goal would be to "identify applicants. . . of whatever race who [have] demonstrated
[their] concern for
disadvantaged minorities. . . ." Id. at 310-11 (citing Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
118 Cal. 3d 34, 56, 553 P.2d 1152, 1167 (1976)).
67. Id. at 312-13.
68. Id. at 315.
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broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin
is but a single though important element." 9 To Justice Powell, the form, as well as
the substance, were properly considered as dispositive on the issue of constitutionality. Supporting this perspective, Justice Powell pointed to other university
admissions programs which use race as only one factor in admission's decisions as
demonstrative that it is not necessary to fix a specified number of minority admittees to achieve the goal of educational diversity.7" In particular, he alluded to the
admissions program at Harvard College7 1 in which the racial or ethnic background
of applicants was considered as a "plus" but did not prevent an individual from being compared with other candidates for admission.72 In so holding, Justice Powell
indicates that a procedural process allowing each candidate to be individually eval73
uated should be given as much weight as the practical effect of such a program.
Four Justices, led by Justice Brennan, 74 concurred in part and dissented in
part. 7" Justice Brennan began by emphasizing that the "central meaning" of the
case should not be lost because of the several opinions rendered by the Justices. 76
"Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any
racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative or
administrative bodies with competence to act in this area."77
In light of a history that has included a statement by the Court that the fourteenth amendment was "the last resort of constitutional arguments"78 and the
Court's recognition of "separate but equal"79 treatment for racial minorities, Justice Brennan felt that a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution was more aspirational than reflective of reality. 8
Justice Brennan agreed that Title VI's prohibitions on discrimination were
equal to those contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments." In addition,
Justice Brennan pointed to federal regulations promulgated to carry out the objec-

69. Id. at 315 (emphasis added). Justice Powell also concluded that the implementation of a "multi-track"
program specifying a number of seats for each "identifiable category" would also be insufficient to achieve the
.genuine diversity" required to gain approval under the strict scrutiny test. Id.
70.Id. at 316.
71. Id. See also id. at321 app. to Opinion ofPowell, J.
72. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18. See also id n.51 discussing a similar admissions program used by Princeton
University.
73. Id. at 318. This aspect of the decision became the holding of Bakke. Some commentators, however, have
suggested that this is an artificial distinction having little practical value. See, e.g., Tribe, Perspectiveson Bakke:
Equal Protection, ProceduralFairness,or StructuralJustice?, 92 HARV. L. REv. 864 (1979).
74. Justice Brennan was joined in his opinion by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun.
75. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324.
76. Id. at 325.
77. Id.(emphasis added).
78. Id.
at 326 (quoting Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,208 (1927)).
79. Id. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
80. Id.
at 327.
81. Id.
at 340.
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tives of Title VI. 82 Specifically, he viewed government regulations compelling83
affirmative action measures where racial minorities have been victims of discrimination by a federally funded institution or program and authorizing 84 the use of
such programs to overcome conditions which have reduced the participation of
certain individuals as conclusive that race-conscious measures may be used to accomplish the remedial purposes of Title V1.8' Finally, Justice Brennan referenced
recent federal legislation setting aside ten percent of federal public works grants
for "minority business enterprises" 8 as also reflective of "congressional judgement that the remedial use of race is permissible under Title VI." 87
While the opinion of the Brennan group, in conjunction with that of Justice Powell, had the substantial effect of foreclosing subsequent attempts by those claiming "reverse discrimination" from enjoying a more favorable treatment under Title
VI than that afforded by the fifth and fourteenth amendments, it is the analysis of
the equal protection claim which has proven to be the most significant aspect of
their opinion. The standard announced by the Brennan group, although unannunciated as such, has become known as the "intermediate" level of review.
First, Justice Brennan stated that "an overriding statutory purpose"88 could justify a governmental classification based on race.8" He further stated that when
such a governmental statute or practice restricts "fundamental rights" or when
"suspect classifications" are used, the Court has subjected it to "strict scrutiny" under which the restriction or classification can only be justified to further a compelling governmental purpose and if no "less restrictive" alternatives are available."
Believing no fundamental rights were involved and that whites lack the "traditional
indicia of suspectness" requiring their protection from the political process, 91 Justice Brennan concluded that the strict scrutiny analysis applied in prior race cases
is inapposite in this context.92

82. Id. at 341-45.
83. Id. at 343. See 45 C. F.R. § 80.3(b)(6)(i) (1977). "In administering a program regarding which the recipient has previously discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or national origin, the recipient
must take affirmative action to overcome the effects ofprior discrimination." Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 344-45. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(6)(ii) (1977). "Even in the absence of such prior discrimination, a
recipient in administering a program may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin." Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 543-45.
86. See Local Public Works Capital Dev. and Inv. Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999 (as amended by
the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
6701 (1977). It was this program that would become the subject of dispute in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980). See also infra notes 109-67 and accompanying text.
87. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 350.
88. Id. at 356 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)).
89. Id. at 355-56. See also McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann,
402 U.S. 1,43 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-01 (1943).
90. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)). Justice Brennan stated that this phraseology of the strict scrutiny test
did not necessarily establish a "two tier" or "sliding scale" analysis. Id. at n.30.
91. For an opposing view, see Van Alstyne, infra note 376.
92. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357-58 (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16-17). See also supranote 36.
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However, citing concerns inherent to any racial classifications, the Brennan
group was also unprepared to consider the case under the traditional rational basis
level of review. 3 Central among those concerns was that:
[P]rograms designed ostensibly to ameliorate the effects of past racial discrimination
obviously create the same hazard of stigma [as those implemented for discriminatory purposes], since they may promote racial separatism and reinforce the views of
those who believe that members of racial minorities are inherently capable of succeeding on their own. 4
Thus, Justice Brennan, believing the strict scrutiny test to be one "strict in theory" and too often, "fatal in fact," but also concerned with the potential for harm
inherent with any racial classification, sought a standard sufficiently flexible to
address these concerns while allowing the admissions program at Davis to be upheld." This goal was fulfilled by adopting a standard previously utilized in evaluating gender-discrimination cases," 6 that the "classifications designed to further
remedial purposes must serve important governmental objectives and must be
1197
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
Applying this standard, Justice Brennan found no constitutional prohibitions to
the admissions program at California Davis.98 In light of the long history of societal discrimination against blacks, the objectives99 of the program were valid although the University itself had never discriminated or made any specific findings
of discrimination. 100 The Brennan group believed it was clear that prior cases had
established that states could voluntarily institute programs to remedy past discrimination without specific findings of discrimination and interpret the qualifications
of minority applicants in light of their race. "' They also found the program satisfied the second prong of the test since it was "substantially related" to achieving its
"remedial purposes. "102 Because the program did not "establish a preserve for mi-

93. d. at 358.
94. Id. at 360 (citing United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172 (1977) (reapportionment plan designed to increase black representation)). See also A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975). "[A] racial
quota .. .is invidious in principle as well as in practice. Moreover, it can as easily be turned against those it
purports to help." Id. at 133.
95. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359-62.
96. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (preferential treatment for women in receipt of retirement benefits); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating law prohibiting the sale of 3.2
percent alcohol beer to males under 21 but to females only under age 18).
97. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359.
98. Id. at 362-79.
99. See supra note 64.
100. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 369-73. Pointing to statistics showing that while blacks constituted 11.1 percent of the
population, they amounted to only 2.2 percent of those in the medical profession, Justice Brennan concluded that
underrepresentation was a sufficient basis upon which to implement the program. Id. at 370 (citing U.S. DEPr.
OF COMMEpCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 Census, vol. 1, pt. 1, Table 60 (1973)). He believed that this
underrepresentation stemmed from a history of "legal disabilities" imposed on blacks from the "inception of our
national life" which required affirmative measures to overcome. Id. at 371-72. See also Bell, Xerces and The
Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv.1595 (1989).
101. Id. at 363-64 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 435 (1975)).
102. Id. at 373-79.
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nority students," but only reduced the number of whites admitted through the ordinary admissions program it did not cause "pervasive" injury to whites. 103 Finally,
the Brennan group found no distinction between the Harvard and Davis programs
except that the Harvard program operated in a manner less apparent to the public. 104

Justice Stevens, joined by three other Justices001 refused to reach the constitutional question. 106 The Stevens group believed that because the University excluded Bakke from the school because of his race, the language of section 601 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964107 required that the judgement below be affirmed. 108
B. Fullilove: Affirmative Action by a Co-equal Branch
The Court next heard an equal protection challenge to an affirmative action
program in Fullilove v. Klutznick. ' In 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works
Employment Act"0 which required localities receiving federal funds to set aside
ten percent of each local public works grant for "minority business enterprises"
(MBE's)." 1' The Act provided for an administrative waiver to be granted after a
finding that the MBE's quote was "unreasonably priced""' 2 and no other qualified
MBE was available to provide the service at a reasonable price. 1 3 The program
was subjected to challenge by several associations of contractors and subcontractors who alleged that the program had caused them economic injury and was on its
face violative of the equal protection clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 114
Following decisions upholding the validity of the set-aside provision by both a
federal district court' and the Second Circuit,' 16 the Supreme Court granted cer-

103. Id. at 374-75.
104. Id. at 378-79.
105. Justice Stevens was joined in the opinion by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist.
106. Id. at 408-21.
107. See supra note 58.
108.Id. at 412-13.
109. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
110. Id. at 453. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 which amended the Local
Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6701-6736 (Supp. 1980). [hereinafter Public Works Act].
111. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. II). An MBE was defined as
a business at least 51 percent owned by citizens "who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indians, Eskimos, and Aluets." Id.
112. Id. at 470-71. An unreasonable price is one exceeding "competitive levels which cannot be attributed to
the minority firm's attempt to cover costs inflated by the present effect of disadvantage or discrimination." Id.
(quoting Economic Development Administration (EDA) Technical Bulletin 9-10; App. 143 a).
113. td. at 470. See also id. at 492, app. to the Opinion of C.J. Burger.
114. Id. at 455. The contractors also alleged the minority set-aside provision violated Titles VI and VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, but all Justices reached and rendered opinions based upon the constitutional issue. Id.
n.5.
115. Fullilove v. Krepps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (1977).
116. Fullilove v. Krepps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978).
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tiorari1" 7 to consider the facial constitutional challenge. 118 Although six Justices
found the program to be constitutionally permissible, the Court again rendered
several opinions and failed to agree as to a level of review. 9
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Powell, announced thejudgment of the Court. 20 The Chief Justice departed from the strict and intermediate
scrutiny framework of Bakke and instead directed the inquiry to whether "the objectives of this legislation [were] within the power of Congress" and if so, "whether
the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, [was] a constitutionally permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives."121 In
order to satisfy this second requirement, the plan must survive a "most searching
examination"122 because any congressional program employing racial criteria to
remedy the present effects of past discrimination must be narrowly tailored to
achieving that goal. 123
Addressing the first criterion, Chief Justice Burger found the Public Works Act
to be an exercise of Congress' spending power124 following a "familiar legislative
pattern" of conditioning the receipt of federal expenditures upon the recipient's
compliance with certain requirements in order to further federal policy objectives. 2 ' The Chief Justice stated that because the reach of Congress' spending
power was no less than its regulatory powers, the set-aside may be upheld if the
under the commerce
objectives of the program would be permissible regulation
126 or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 127
clause
Concerning the power of Congress to regulate the practices of prime contractors receiving federal funds for public works construction, Chief Justice Burger
believed the legislative history of the set-aside provision provided a rational basis
for Congress to have concluded that the inequity produced by past discriminatory
practices used by prime contractors in selecting subcontractors affected interstate
commerce. 128 With respect to Congress' regulatory powers under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment, the Chief Justice concluded that the "positive grant of leg-

117. 441 U.S. 960 (1979).
118. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453.
119. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 452.
120. Id. at 453.
121. Id. at 480.
122. Id. at 491.
123. Id. at 480.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1.

125. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474. See, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548 (1937).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
127. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 476 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, giving Congress the power to enforce the
substantive provisions of the fburteenth amendment by "appropriate legislation").
128. Id. at 475. Seea/so Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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islative power"'29 provided by section 5 afforded Congress the power to enact the
MBE provision. 30
Turning to the second area of inquiry, in which Chief Justice Burger addressed
the contractor's arguments against the validity of the set-aside provision under the
fourteenth amendment, he again noted the "deference" and "limited scope of inquiry" the Court should use in reviewing an act of Congress.' 3 ' Pointing to prior
cases dismissing the assertion that the Constitution is "color-blind," the Chief Justice immediately disposed of that aspect of the contractor's argument. 32 The
Chief Justice also disposed of the claim that the provision impermissibly deprived
nonminority contractors the opportunity to participate in contracts awarded under
the Public Works Act because it did not violate the Constitution for innocent parties to share the burden created by programs to remedy prior discrimination. 33 In
addition, Chief Justice Burger did not believe an affirmative action program may
by deemed "underinclusive" because it singles out only certain minority groups to
receive benefits. 34 It was not a constitutional infirmity that Congress sought to
3
eliminate a broader problem one step at a time. 1
The Chief Justice, expressing concern for administrative safeguards to ensure
the program's adherence to its remedial purpose, then limited the heretofore broad
language of his opinion while addressing the contractor's final assertion; that the
program was "overinclusive" because it awarded benefits based on minority ownership as opposed to criteria which would demonstrate a previous competitive disadvantage due to past discrimination. 36 "[E]ven in the context of a facial
challenge," Chief Justice Burger believed that the MBE provision could not be upheld unless it provided a "reasonable assurance" that the use of racial classifications were limited to accomplishing Congress' remedial objectives.' 37 Thus, the

129. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966).
130. Id. at 476. See also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1980) (upholding section201
of the Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1970, 84 Stat. 315 (1970), which prevented the use of voter qualification
devices for a period of five years); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (tests to determine ability to vote).
Chief Justice Burger also referred to the "abundant evidence" compiled by Congress to conclude that discrimination in the construction industry had prevented "effective participation" in the competition for public works projects. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477-78. The issue of the necessary finding of facts by the institution promulgating
the racial classification has been a reoccurring theme in affirmative action cases. Thus far, although the Court
has failed to set forth a specific standard, it is clear that the Justices have given greater deference to whatever
findings of fact are revealed in the legislative history of an act of Congress than of other legislative and administrative bodies. See infra
notes 200-258, 275-337 and accompanying text.
131. Fllilove, 448 U.S. at 480.
132. Id.at 482 (citing North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402
U.S. 39, 41 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1971)). Interestingly,
Justice Burger did not cite any opinion from Bakke as support for this proposition, nor did he at any other place in
his opinion use Bakke as a relevant precedent for consideration of the MBE provision.
133. Id. at 484 (citing United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)).
134. Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 485.
135. Id. (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955)).
136. Id. at 486-92.
137. Id. at 487.
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administrative safeguards providing for a waiver'3 8 of the ten percent MBE requirement and for reporting of "unjust participation" in the program' 39 were material to the constitutionality of the program as they provided a remedy for the
misuse of the racial criteria.14 The Chief Justice concluded by stating that the racial criteria had received a "most searching examination" and that the MBE provision would have been upheld under any of the standards set forth in Bakke. 4 '
Justice Powell concurred in the judgement, but wrote separately to declare the
Court's need to articulate a standard of review.142 As he had done in Bakke, Justice
Powell applied strict scrutiny to the congressional set-aside provisions.'" Because only a constitutional or statutory violation could create a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to justify the implementation of a racial preference,
no interest would be compelling without a finding by "an appropriate governmental authority" that such a violation had occurred. 1" Thus, only a governmental
body having authority to respond to identified discrimination and which has established a factual predicate may implement race-conscious measures. 1' Having satisfied these requirements, the governmental authority may then craft narrowly
drawn measures to achieve its remedial objective.146 In applying these factors to
the set-aside provision however, Justice Powell believed the Court was required to
give "explicit recognition" to the fact that it was reviewing an act of Congress."'
Justice Powell stated that unlike the Regents in Bakke, who had not met either
requirement, it was "beyond question" that Congress was competent to both find
and redress constitutional violations. 1" In addition, Congress was not required to
include explicit findings of constitutional violations in the act's legislative history
because its experience in dealing with discrimination in the construction industry
had provided a sufficient basis for the conclusion that both private and governmental discrimination had caused the small percentage of minority contractors being awarded public contracts. 14
Finally, Justice Powell addressed whether the means employed were narrowly
tailored to achieving the remedial objective.1I Regarding the availability of a "less
intrusive means," Justice Powell pointed out that even after antidiscrimination leg-

138. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
139. Id.
140. Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 487-89.
141. Id.at491-92.
142.Id. at 495.
143. Id.at495-517.
144. Id.at 498.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.at 499. While at the time, the deference shown to Congress may have appeared as dicta to state and
local governments who proceeded to adopt similar construction set-asides, it would later become a central and
dispositive consideration in J.A. Croson v. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469 (1989). See infra notes 200-258 and
accompanying text.
148. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 499.
149. Id.at 502-03.
150. Id. at 507-17.
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islation, executive action, and aid to minority businesses, such businesses still reThus, by the time Congress
ceived less than one percent of federal contracts.'
had enacted the MBE provisions, it was aware that other measures had failed to
overcome the effects of past discrimination in the construction industry.5 2 Finally, Justice Powell concluded the percentage of federal funds set-aside by the
MBE provision was reasonable in light of the waiver provision which would prevent hardships to those conducting public works projects in areas with a low minority population. 3
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, also concurred in
the judgement but wrote separately to analyze the MBE provision under the intermediate level of scrutiny. Under this standard, the Marshall group believed the
validity of the set-aside was not even a "close" question. 15 1 In light of the substantial underrepresentation of minorities receiving public contracts, Congress was
correct in finding a sufficient governmental interest to justify the use of race-conscious measures. 155 The set-aside provision was also substantially related to an
important governmental purpose because it was "carefully tailored" to remedy the
"present effects of past discrimination."5 6
57
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, filed a dissenting opinion.
While the Justices constituting the Bakke and Fullilove pluralities had debated the
level of review without seriously questioning the constitutionality of benign race
conscious measures, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist unequivocally stated a different position:
'Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens .... The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color. . . .' Those words were written by a Member of this Court 84
years ago. His colleagues disagreed with him, and held that a statute that required
the separation of people on the basis of their race was constitutionally valid because
it was a 'reasonable' exercise of legislative power and had been 'enacted in good faith
for the promotion [of] the public good . ..' Today, our Court upholds a statute
that accords a preference to [certain] citizens ... for much the same reason. I
think today's
decision is wrong for the same reason that Plessy v. Ferguson was
58
wrong. 1
Justice Stevens refused to acknowledge any difference between racial classifications which disadvantage minorities and those disadvantageous to members of
the dominant political group. 9 He likewise perceived no distinction between an

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 511
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

(citing 110 CONG. REc. 7156 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Brooke)).

515.
517-19.
520.
520-21.
522-32.
522-23 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,550-59 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
525-26.
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exercise of congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment and
actions of other governmental bodies believing an unconstitutional law, "is no less
unconstitutional just because it is a product of the Congress of the United
States." 16 °
Justice Stewart also addressed an issue that has received greater attention in
later cases, the extent to which affirmative action programs such as the set-aside
provision are truly remedial, in that they constitute compensation for instances of
"actual discrimination," or instead, awards benefits to redress "societal discrimination."' 61 In his view, Congress had no greater authority than the judiciary to impose race-conscious measures, which may only do so to compensate actual
instances of illegal discrimination.' 62 Justice Stewart also believed that because
equal protection was a guarantee to individuals instead of races, the principle
could not be used to justify laws seeking racial balance.163 Justice Stewart disagreed with the plurality's reliance on school desegregation cases to justify disparate treatment because, while student assignments were predicated upon race, they
'
did not deprive any student of the opportunity to obtain a public education. 64
Justice Stevens also issued a dissenting opinion, and although discounting the
absolute language of Justice Stewart that the equal protection clause prohibited any
racial classification, he also made clear his dissatisfaction with the MBE program:
"Because racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate
treatment, and because classifications based on race are potentially so harmful to
the entire body politic, it is especially important that the reasons for any such classification be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate."'6 5 This view was
were
at least partially based on his belief that the six 166 enumerated classifications
67
1
race.
than
other
criteria
reflect
to
failed
they
arbitrary because
C. Wygant: Layoffs andHeightened Expectations
Six years following Fullilove, the Supreme Court again faced an equal protection challenge to an affirmative action measure in fgant v. Jackson Board of Education. 168 The controversy involved a layoff provision in a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) between the Jackson, Michigan Board of Education and the

160. Id. at 526-27.
161. Id. at 527-31.
162. Id. at 528 (citing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)).
163. Id. at 529-30. See also id. n. 11 revealing that whites constituted 83.4 percent of persons age 25 and over
who had failed to complete high school and 79 percent of households with annual incomes under $5,000.
164. Id. at 527 n.6.
165. Id. at 533-34.
166. See supra note 111.
167. Id. at 535. Justice Powell suggested that "economic, social, geographical, [and] historical" factors should
alsobe considered. Id. See also id. n.6.
168. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Justice Stewart retired from the Court and was replaced by Justice O'Connor during the interim between R4gant and Fullilove.
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teachers' union.1"' The agreement mandated that if layoffs should become necessary, the seniority system would be used in determining the persons to be retained
only to the extent that it did not lessen the percentage of minority teachers employed at the time of the layoff. 7 Tenured white teachers laid off as a result of the
plan brought suit alleging that the plan violated their rights to equal protection un' The plan was upheld by a federal district court
der the fourteenth amendment. 71
and the Sixth Circuit' 72 on the basis that the school board's attempt to remedy "societal discrimination by providing 'role models' for minority schoolchildren" was a
constitutionally permissible goal.' 73 The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 74 to
determine the constitutionality of race-based layoffs by public employers. 7 5 Six
Justices voted to reverse, but once again, only a plurality of the Court was able to
agree as to a single rationale.' 76
Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court.177 Like the programs in
Bakke and Fullilove, Justice Powell believed the layoff provision warranted the application of strict scrutiny. 7 ' None of the justifications advanced by the school
district for the layoff provision satisfied the strict scrutiny test according to Justice
Powell. "' Because the Court had never ruled that societal discrimination would
justify the use of racial classifications, the "role model" theory advanced by the
Instead of the
school district was not a constitutionally permissible goal.'
"amorphous concept" of societal discrimination, the Court had always required
that "actual discrimination" be demonstrated before sanctioning the use of raceconscious measures. 181 For purposes of establishing actual discrimination, Justice
Powell believed that there was no connection between the "percentage of minority

169. Id. at 270. The Jackson (Michigan) Board of Education proposed the plan to the Union believing that it
would help to alleviate racial tensions in the community by maintaining a greater minority presence on the faculty in the event of layoffs, and the plan was approved by the teacher's union (Jackson Education Association) and
included in its collective bargaining agreement. Id.
170. Id. at 270-71. When layoffs became necessary, the Board did not enforce the agreement to the extent that
it would have resulted in tenured white teachers being laid off while minority teachers still on probation would
have been retained. Id. at 271. This resulted in a series of lawsuits both in state and federal courts by minority
teachers seeking to have the provision enforced. The federal district court dismissed for want ofjurisdiction on a
state-law contract claim and while the suit in state court primarily focused on the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act,
that court did believe the program was justified in light of past societal discrimination. Id. This suit resulted in
the plan being implemented as called for in the CBA. Id. at 271-72.
171. Id. at 272-73.
172. 746 F.2d 1152 (1984).
173. 145gant, 476 U.S. at 272.
174. 471 U.S. 1014(1985).
175. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267.
176. Id.
177. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and in part by Justice O'Connor.
178. Id. at 273-84.
179. Id. at 273-78.
180. Id. at 274-76.
181. Id. at 274.
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students and the percentage of minority faculty."182 For that purpose, the proper
inquiry would consist of a comparison between the school's teaching staff "and the
racial composition of the qualified public school teacher population in the relevant
labor market."183 Likewise, Justice Powell was unpersuaded that the program was
enacted to remedy past discrimination by the school district since it had made no
findings of discrimination and in earlier litigation by minority school teachers, 8
had denied the existence of past discriminatory hiring practices."'
It was, however, Justice Powell's consideration of the narrowly tailored prong
of the strict scrutiny test, 186 which was perhaps the most important aspect of the
judgement.187 Justice Powell believed a distinction existed between layoff provisions and hiring or admissions programs. While acknowledging that it is not impermissible for innocent parties to share the burden of a "properly tailored"
remedial program, Justice Powell believed the burden imposed on innocent parties
was too great in the context of a layoff provision.18 Pointing to the "rights and expectations surrounding seniority," Justice Powell concluded that layoff provisions
cause serious disruption to the lives of those affected; a much more direct burden
than hiring goals which only tend to foreclose one of several available opportunities. 189
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion, and while she agreed that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate level of review, she disagreed as to the reason the program failed the second prong of the test.' 90 Unlike the Powell group, Justice

182. Id. at 274-76 (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977)). Absent past instances of actual discrimination, "nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or
less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which the employees are hired." Id. at 307 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977)).
183. Id. at 275 (quoting Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308). Justice Powell points out that giving weight to the role
model theory could also be used "to escape the obligation to remedy" prior discrimination. Id. at 276. This is a
particularly valid observation given the number of "independent" school districts located in upper-class communities, which although themselves have a small percentage of minority students, are a part ofa large metropolitan area in which a substantial minority population constitutes a significant percentage of the local labor pool.
184. See supra note 172.
185. Wyant, 476 U.S. at 277-78.
186. See id. at 280 n.6. Justice Powell states that the term narrowly tailored means not only that the racial
classification impose as little burden as is possible on nonminorities, but should also "be used to require consideration of whether lawful alternative[s] and less restrictive means could have been used." Id. See also Ely, The
Constitutionalityof Reverse RacialDiscrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REv.723, 727 n.26 (1974); Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of"Benign"RacialPreference in Law School Admissions, 75 CoLuM. L. REV.559, 578-79 (1975).
187. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-84.
188. Id. at 280-84 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976)).
189. Id. at 283. See also id. n. 11. Justice Powell analogizes the injury suffered by one under the layoff provision to an injury suffered by a person "removed from law school in their third year." Id. One can however, question whether this burden prevented the program from being narrowly tailored. Because the layoff provision
required that white teachers be laid off only to the extent that was necessary to preserve the hiring program, it
would be hard to concieve of a means by which the program could have been more narrowly drawn. The point
might have been more properly addressed by saying that the purported state interest was insufficient to justify the
burden the program imposed on nonminorities. However, a close reading of the cases suggests the Justices are
more comfortable elaborating on the failings of a program while discussing the second prong of the test than while
addressing what constitutes a sufficient governmental interest to justify the use of racial classifications.
190. Id. at 284-94. Justice O'Connor also addressed the findings of fact required before a public employer may
implement an affirmative action program. Id. at 287-93.

1991]

HEIGHTENEDSCRUTINY OR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

O'Connor did not specifically rule out the possibility that a layoff provision could
be held constitutional. 191 Nevertheless, the layoff provision did not meet the narrowly tailored requirement because the hiring program, the results of which the
layoff provision was designed to maintain, was impermissibly based on the percentage of minorities in the student body -a statistic not "probative of employment discrimination. "1192
Justice White also concurred in the judgement but did not address the standard
of review or offer support for any of the aforementioned rationales. 93 Justice
White believed that regardless of the legitimacy of the school's hiring goals, "the
discharge of white teachers to make room for blacks, none of whom has been
94
shown to be a victim of any racial discrimination, is quite a different matter."
The three Justices who had heretofore applied the intermediate scrutiny test to
affirmative action programs, again joined in an opinion authored by Justice Marshall.195 Justice Marshall believed the community's history of racial strife rendered the integration of the school's faculty a constitutionally permissible goal. 96
Because the layoff provision was implemented to maintain the level of faculty integration achieved by the hiring program, the layoff provision was likewise constitutional. 97 Justice Marshall also saw the layoff provision as an appropriate means
to achieve this purpose. 198 Because the plan preserved the seniority system where
possible and proportionately allocated the burden between the two racial groups,
it was less burdensome than other measures the school could have employed, such
199
as a freeze on minority layoffs.
D. Croson: The JusticesAgree
The Court's decision in Fullilove, seemingly granting approval to minority setasides in the construction industry, led to the implementation of construction setasides by many state and local governments. One such program, was the subject
of an equal protection challenge in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson.20 The Minority Business Utilization Plan (plan) required that prime contractors awarded city
contracts reserve thirty percent of the dollar amount of such contracts for

191. Idat 293-94.
192. Id. at 294.
193. Id. at 294-95.
194. Id. at 295.
195. Id. at 295-312. As a threshold issue, Justice Marshall concluded that, due to the hurried manner in which
the case was tried by the district court, the factual record was insufficient to properly decide the case and that
before declaring the layoff provision unconstitutional, the court should have remanded the case for further findings. Id. at 295-304.
196. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 297.
197. Id. at 306.
198. Id. at 306-12.
199. Id. at 309-10. Justice Stevens also dissented stating that since the program advances the public interest in
educating children, the plan was not an undue burden. Id. at 313-20.
200. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). For a complete analysis of Croson, see Note, Strict Scrutiny as Applied to RaceConsciousAffirmative Action Programs, 10 Miss. C.L. REv. 95 (1989).
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MBE's. 20 1 A qualified MBE from anywhere in the United States was eligible for
participation and a waiver could only be obtained in "exceptional circumstances. "202
The petitioner was a prime contractor awarded a contract to install plumbing
fixtures in the city jail who had sought a waiver or price adjustment when he was
unable to find but one MBE interested in the project, and whose bid was over
$6000 higher than quotes from a non-MBE and whom he considered unqualified
since he was not an authorized dealer of certain fixtures required for the job. 20 3 He
instituted suit when the city not only rejected his request for a waiver but also cancelled the contract and rebid the project. 2 4 The plan was initially upheld by the
Fourth Circuit, 20 5 but was struck down 2 6 after that opinion was vacated in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Wygant.207 The Supreme Court granted certiorari208 to hear the city's appeal of that decision . 209 Although the division among
the Justices remained sharp, a majority of the Court finally agreed on a level of
review. 210 Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with exception to the parts of her opinion addressing the
effect of the fourteenth amendment on the states and Congress in enacting raceconscious measures.
Justice O'Connor first addressed the scope of the city's power to redress past
discrimination by adopting affirmative action programs .212 The analysis in Fullilove was inapposite in this context because as a state entity, the city council was
constrained by section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, while Congress benefited
from the "positive" grant of legislative power provided by section 5.213 However,
since Virginia state law afforded the city council authority to use its spending
powers to remedy private discrimination, it was not subject to the Wygant plurality
holding that only past discrimination by the governmental body itself would suffice to implement race-conscious remedies. 214 Thus, while the O'Connor group
would not subject a state legislative decision to a de novo review, it would not be
given the deference shown an act of Congress.

201. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
202. Id. at 478-79.
203. Id. at 481-82.
204.Id. at 483.
205. 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1985).
206. 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987).
207. Croson, 488 U.S. at 482.
208. 484 U.S. 1058 (1988).
209. Croson, 488 U.S. at 486.
210. The Chief Justice and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy made up the majority. Although
Justice Powell had retired from the Court, the addition ofJustices Scalia and Kennedy enabled his Bakke analysis
to prevail over the as yet acknowledged "intermediate" scrutiny framework advanced by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
211. Croson, 488 U.S. at 476. Justice Scalia did not expressly join any part of her opinion, but wrote a separate
opinion in which he did agree that strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review.
212. Id. at 486-93.
213. Id. at 490.
214. Id. at 492.
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Next, joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy,2 1 Justice O'Connor
stated that the plan should be subject to strict scrutiny.2"' Justice O'Connor believed that even if a lesser standard of review would suffice in some affirmative
action cases, heightened scrutiny would still be appropriate here because five of
the nine city council members who enacted the plan were black.217 Unlike Congress, a state was unable to satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny test solely by
relying on societal discrimination because, absent "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings" of actual discrimination, a compelling governmental interest is
not demonstrated.21 8
Justice O'Connor, speaking for the Court, concluded that the justifications set
forth by the city did not comprise a sufficient factual basis to demonstrate "actual
discrimination. '219 That the city council had labeled the plan "remedial" was "entitled to little or no weight. 22' Likewise, the statement of a city councilman that
discrimination was widespread in the construction industry was insufficient to
justify the use of racial classifications. 221 "A governmental actor cannot render
race a legitimate proxy for a particular condition merely by declaring that the condition exists."222 Further, the Court did not accept the disparity between the city's
minority population and the number of MBE's receiving city construction contracts as a competent basis for enacting the set-aside since the proper comparison
would have been between MBE's receiving public contracts and those who were
qualified to undertake a public works project.223 Because the city had not sought
to ascertain the number of qualified MBE's in the Richmond area, there was no
evidence presented which would enable the Court to determine whether actual discrimination had occurred. 224 The Court also believed the dearth of minority
membership in contractor's associations was inadequate to demonstrate a prima
facia case of discrimination without findings demonstrating the number of MBE's
in the locality which would be eligible for membership.2 25
Finally, Justice O'Connor believed that the congressional findings reviewed in
Fullilove, which revealed nationwide discrimination in the construction industry,
had "extremely limited" probative value with respect to the situation in Rich215. Justice Scalia also agreed that strict scrutiny should be applied, but took a more restrictive view than those
joining this aspect of Justice O'Connor's opinion. See inft notes 241-50 and accompanying text.
216. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-98.
217. Id. at 495-96.
218. Id. at 497 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308-09 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
219. Id. at 498-506. The city offered five "facts" to justify its program: (1)that the ordinance declares itself to
be remedial; (2) several persons who spoke at a public meeting stated that discrimination in the construction industry was widespread; (3) while minorities constituted 50 percent of the city's population, MBE's received only
0.67 percent of the city's prime construction contracts; (4) there was a dearth of minority membership in local
contractor's associations; and (5) that Congress, in enacting its MBE provision had found nationwide discrimination in the construction industry. Id. at 499.
220. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 500-01.
223. Id. at 501-02.
224. Id. at 502-03.
225. Id. at 503.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 11:369

mond.228 Congress' inclusion of a flexible waiver provision in its MBE provision
was viewed by Justice O'Connor as recognition that the scope of the problem varied in different regions of the country.227 Moreover, in determining whether public spending perpetuates the effect of past discrimination, the states do not benefit
from the broad grant of remedial power provided to Congress by section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment.22 While Justice O'Connor recognized that states may
take remedial action when they possess evidence that their spending habits continue patterns of prior discrimination, they will be required to identify actual discrimination before implementing an affirmative action program.2 29
The Court concluded that the MBE provision also failed the second prong of the
strict scrutiny test.23 First, the city had failed to evaluate race-neutral alternatives
of advancing minority participation in public contracts. 3 1 Second, because the
program applied to any MBE in the United States and lacked the procedural safeguards of the congressional provision, the Court held that the Richmond program
was more likely addressed towards "racial balancing" than remedying the present
effects of past discrimination in the Richmond area.23 2
Justice Stevens, wrote separately and expressed a perspective unique among the
Justices regarding attempts by legislative bodies to compensate for past discrimination. While emphasizing that it is entirely appropriate for the city to compensate victims whom it has itself discriminated against, he expressed concern about
the appropriateness of a legislature attempting to remedy past discrimination by
private parties.234 Justice Steven's viewed "legislatures [as] primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules to govern future conduct," and linked the MBE
program to ex post facto laws and bills of attainder which are constitutionally prohibited because they seek to proscribe conduct after its occurrence.23 5
Justice Kennedy concurred, but wrote separately to explain his failure to join
that part of Justice O'Connor's opinion dealing with the power of Congress to use
race-conscious measures .236 "The process by which a law that is an equal protec-

226. Id. at 504.
227. Id. This may seem an inappropriate statement in light of the city's 50 percent black population, but the
city's MBE provision included the same groups identified by Congress, some of which had little or no representation in the general population. "There is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against Spanish-speaking,
Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any aspect of the Richmond construction industry." Id. at 506. "It
may well be that Richmond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen." Id.
228. Id. at 504.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 507-08.
231. Id. at 507. Justice O'Connor stated that the city could, for instance, have tried financial aid programs to
help small businesses. She further distinguished Fullilove by recalling that Congress had tried such measures
before instituting public works set-asides. Id.
232. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
233. Croson, 488 U.S. at 511-17 (Stevens, J. concurring).
234. Id. at513. See also id. n.3.
235. Id. See also id. n.2, 3. Justice Stevens has not consistently voted for or against affirmative action programs. For instance, while he dissented in Bakke and Fullilove where the Court upheld affirmative action programs, he also dissented in Mygant favoring the teacher layoff provision.
236. Croson, 488 U.S. at 518-19 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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tion violation when enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal protection
guarantee when enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition for
me .... "237 He also failed to see any limitation imposed on the states by the fourteenth amendment in eradicating the effects of discrimination except that the remedy chosen not, as here, violate equal protection guarantees.238 However, his at
least partial embracement of Justice Scalia's opinion"' and his statement that "racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause," 240 indicated
that he was less inclined than Justice O'Connor to accept race-conscious measures
enacted by states, and certainly less inclined than she to accept those enacted by
Congress.
Justice Scalia, without joining any part of Justice O'Connor's opinion, concurred in the judgement and wrote a separate opinion.24 1 Justice Scalia agreed that
all governmental classifications based on race must be subjected to strict scrutiny.242 He strongly disagreed, however, with any dicta offered by the other Justices that the fourteenth amendment might allow state and local governments to
implement race-conscious measures to overcome the present effects of past discrimination. 2' According to Justice Scalia, a state could employ race-conscious
relief only when necessary to compensate for its own participation in unlawful discrimination. 2" He did believe however, that a state may act to eradicate the effects
of past discrimination, even in manners which have a disparate impact on whites,
so long as. it does not use racial classifications.245
Although the tone of his opinion indicates a hostility to any affirmative action
program, Justice Scalia did indicate that there is a difference between Congress
and the states. One distinction is that the fourteenth amendment was meant to
Justice
limit the power of the states while enlarging the powers of Congress.
Scalia also saw a practical difference between Congress and state or local legislatures .247 "An acute awareness of the heightened danger of oppression from political factions in small, rather than large, political units dates to the very beginning
of our national history." 2 Justice Scalia believed the situation in Croson, where

237. Id. at 518.
238. Id. at 519.
239. See infra notes 240-49. Justice Kennedy stated that while he was content that Justice O'Connor's strict
scrutiny standards were currently sufficient, he indicated that he might be willing to break with prior precedent
and accept Justice Scalia's analysis at some point. Id.
240. Id. at 518.
241. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-28 (Scalia, J. concurring).
242. Id. at 520.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 524.
245. Id. at 526. He cited permissible programs as those granting preferences to new or small businesses as
examples. Id. No Justice has ever expressed the view that such programs, although they may disproportionally
advantage blacks, raise a constitutional question.
246. Croson, 488 U.S. at 521-22.
247. Id. at 523.
248. Id. (citing G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPuBuc, 1776-1787 at 499-506 (1969)). See
also MADISON. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 82-84 (C. Rossister ed. 1961).
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the dominant political group in a small legislative body had instituted a racial classification, was precisely the conduct the fourteenth amendment was enacted to
eliminate.249 Finally, Justice Scalia agreed that there was a distinction between
societal and actual discrimination, but that even a finding of actual discrimination
by anyone but the governmental entity itself would only supply authority to adopt a
race-neutral means of remedying past discrimination. 0
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented and applied the intermediate level of review."' Under this test, the set-aside instituted by
the city of Richmond served "important governmental objectives" and was "substantially related" to achieving those objectives. 2 ' Specifically, Justice Marshall
took issue with the majority's characterization of the fourteenth amendment as a
limit on the states in adopting remedial race-conscious measures and the necessary factual predicate required before such a program may be instituted.2" 3
The Marshall group believed the majority was "seriously mistaken" in its belief
that the fourteenth amendment served to limit the ability of the states to remedy
past discrimination. 5 4 "Nothing whatever in the legislative history of either the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Acts even remotely suggests that the
States are foreclosed from furthering the fundamental purpose of equal opportunity to which the Amendment and those Acts are addressed." 5 Justice Marshall
also believed that the Constitution did not require the states to carefully document
instances of past discrimination when conditions make the existence of such discrimination readily apparent.256 In his view, the Congressional findings at issue in
Fullilove had created a "presumption" of discrimination in the construction industry in which the states should be entitled to "share."25 7 The information assembled
by the city council, though containing no documentation of specific instances of
discrimination, should be sufficient for the majority to recognize that Richmond
was no exception to the nationwide pattern of discrimination in the construction
industry.5 8
E. The FCC:Pursuingthe Public Interest
It was in this uncertain background in which the FCC minority ownership policies were formulated and later questioned. The rationale behind the minority policies can best be understood by reference to its statutory purpose and the history

249. Id. at 524.
250. Id. at 526. For instance, the city could adopt a preference program for victims of identified discrimination
because those receiving the preference would be identified upon the basis of this disadvantage as opposed to race.
Id.
251. Croson, 488 U.S. at 528-61 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
252. Id. at 535-53.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 557.
255. Id. at 559-60 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 368).
256. Croson, 488 U.S. at 548.
257. Id. at 547.
258. Id. at 530.
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which led to their adoption. The FCC was created by the Communications Act of
1934 to regulate broadcasting and conduct the licensing process to serve the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."2"9 In 1982, Congress further expanded the
FCC's authority to conduct licensing decisions for the "public interest" by implementing new procedures for allocating certain types of broadcast licenses.260
The FCC first clarified its interpretation of the public interest as it relates to licensing decisions in a 1965 policy statement.261 In order to effectuate the public
interest through broadcasting, the comparative hearing process would be conducted with the objectives of granting licenses to applicants who would offer "the
best practicable service to the public" and who would offer "a maximum diffusion
of control of the media of mass communications."26 2 The emphasis on diversity of
ownership was primarily based on the belief that it would further the goals of the
first amendment by increasing content diversity.26 3
The FCC first addressed the issue of minorities in the broadcast industry by
adopting policies that expressly prohibited discrimination by its current licensees. 264 However, the FCC did not consider minority ownership as a factor in
the comparative hearing process until 1973 when a federal appeals court reversed
its refusal not to award such a preference, holding that minority ownership would
further the public interest by increasing content diversity.265 Faced with this
court's decision, and a task force report revealing a dearth of minority owners of
broadcast facilities,266 the FCC then formally implemented three programs to increase the number of groups with "significant minority ownership interests" oper-

259. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,301,303,307,309 (1982).
260. See 1982 Amendments to the Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A) (granting the FCC
authority to use a lottery system to award licenses for "low power" broadcast facilities, but requiring that the lottery be weighted in favor of any applicant who would further broadcast diversity). See also ShurbergBroadcasting of Hartford,Inc., 876 F.2d 902, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
261. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). See also Comment, The
Constitutionalityofthe FCC's Use of Race and Sex in the Grantingof BroadcastLicenses, 83 Nw.U.L. REv. 665
(1989) [hereinafter Comment on the FCC's Use of Race].
262. Policy Statement, I F.C.C.2d at 394. The statement listed six factors it would consider to advance these
two objectives: (1) diversification of control; (2) full time participation station operation by owners; (3) proposed programming service; (4) past broadcast record; (5) efficient use of the frequency; and (6) character of the
applicants. Id. at 394-98. See Comment on FCC's Use of Race, supra note 261 at 672.
263. See Policy Statement, 1 F.C.C.2d at 394 n.4. See also Comment on the FCC's Use of Race, supra note 261
at 672.
264. The Commission issued guidelines prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, NondiscriminationEmployment Practicesof Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.2d 240 (1969), and
soon added sex as a prohibited basis, Nondiscrimination Employment Practices of Broadcast Licenses, 23
F.C.C.2d 430 (1970).
265. T.V. 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
266. FederalCommunication Commission' Minority Ownership Task Force, Minority OwnershipReport (1978).
The report revealed that while minorities constituted approximately 20 percent of the general population, they
had controlling ownership in less than one percent of the 8500 radio and television stations operating at that time.
Id.
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ating broadcast outlets.2 67 First, the FCC would continue its process of awarding
enhancements to qualified groups.268 Second, a current licensee whose license
had come into question could execute a "distress sale," a procedure by which the
licensee sells his or her license to a minority controlled group before a renewal
hearing by the FCC to determine if the licensee should be allowed to continue
broadcasting."' Finally, the commission would grant a tax certificate allowing a
licensee who sells to a minority controlled group to receive deferred capital gains
treatment on the sale.27 The FCC also adopted a similar comparative hearing7 en2
hancement, but of lesser weight, for groups with female ownership interest. '
These policies were brought into question when a federal appeals court disallowed the use of the female ownership preference.2 72 This court decision, as well
as pending challenges to the minority ownership policies, led the FCC to begin an
inquiry into its constitutional and statutory power to consider race in awarding
broadcast licenses.273 However, before the completion of this inquiry, Congress
passed the appropriations act for fiscal year 1988 which prohibited the FCC from
using any of its appropriation to reevaluate its minority or female ownership policies .274 The challenges to the constitutionality of the minority ownership policies
would become the next equal protection challenge to an affirmative action program considered by the Supreme Court.
IV. INSTANT

CASE

The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Brennan.27 The Court commenced its opinion by stating that "[i]t is of overriding significance that the FCC's
minority ownership programs have been specifically approved -indeed, mandated - by Congress. "276 Thus, the Court's decision in Crosonwould not control in
determining the level of scrutiny or in otherwise assessing the constitutionality of
the FCC minority policies.277 The majority believed that both the language and
rationale of Croson established that racial classifications implemented by Con-

267. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of BroadcastFacilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978) [hereinafter
MinorityPolicy Statement]. The term "significant minority ownership interest" required the percentage of minority ownership to exceed 50 percent or be controlling. Id. at 983 n.20. This requirement was later relaxed to
include limited partnerships in which a minority is the general partner, although not necessarily owning a controlling interest. Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, 92
F.C.C.2d 849, 853-54 (1982).
268. Minority Policy Statement, 68 EC.C.2d 979, 982 (1978).
269. Id. at 983. The distress sale benefits a current licensee whose qualifications have come into question because if his license renewal was denied, it would be worth nothing because any potential buyer would be required
to go through the comparative hearing process.
270. Minority Policy Statement, 68 F.C.C.2d at 982. See also id. 983 n. 19.
271. See Mid FloridaTelevision Corp., 69 FC.C.2d 607 (1978) (rev. bd.).
272. See Steele, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
273. Reexamination of Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, Order, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 766 (1988). The study
was also referred to as the FCC Docket 84-484 inquiry.
274. See Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-31 (1988).
275. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3002-28. Justice Brennan was joined in the majority by Justices Marshall, White, Blackmun, and Stevens.
276. Id. at 3008.
277. Id. at 3009.
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gress are subject to a different standard than those adopted by state and local governments. 7 8 Such measures, when implemented by Congress, should be
considered under the intermediate scrutiny standard first announced by Justice
Brennan in Bakke.279
The Court first addressed whether the goal of the program, increasing minority
participation in broadcasting and thereby enhancing content diversity, was an important governmental interest.2 8 ' The majority pointed out that Congress and the
FCC did not attempt to justify the FCC policies solely as remedial measures, but
also as a means to enhance program diversity, which they also believed was an important governmental interest. 81 Since "it is the right of viewers and listeners, not
the right of broadcasters which is paramount," the "public interest standard necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles."282 Like the diverse student body which contributed to a "robust exchange of ideas," the Court viewed
broadcast diversity as means of furthering the values of the first amendment. 28
The Court also concluded that the minority policies were substantially related
to achieving their objectives.2 84 The majority believed it was required to give
"great weight" to the views of Congress and the experience of the FCC with regard
to the assumed nexus between minority ownership and broadcast content. 85 Because the conclusion that increasing minority control of broadcasting outlets
would aid content diversity was a product of the FCC's experience in the area of
broadcast regulation, the Court felt it deserved substantial deference. 88
The Court also found instances of Congressional expression of the existence of
a nexus between ownership and diversity of content. 87 Although this expression
was not explicitly stated in the legislative history of the appropriations act,288 the
Court believed limiting its inquiry to the legislative history "would erect an artificial barrier to [a] full understanding of the legislative process. 289 For example,
Congress had rejected attempts to eliminate the comparative hearing process upon
hearing testimony that doing so would have the effect of excluding minority
groups from broadcasting by freezing the distribution of broadcast licenses in

278. Id. Justice Brennan was referring to dicta in Justice O'Connor's opinion that Congress may identify and
redress the effects of society-wide discrimination. Id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 490) and the "social reality and
governmental theory" language of Justice Scalia. Id.(quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 522).
279. Id. at 3009.
280. Id. at 3008-11.
281.Id. at 3010.
282. Id. (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Bmadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978)).
283. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-13).
284. Id.at 3011-3027.
285. Id.at 3011 (citing Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 10203(1973).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 3012-16.
288. See supra note 32.
289. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3013 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502).
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well-established markets.29 The Court found that Congress' adoption of a lottery
system for use in the award of licenses for low power television stations demonstrated congressional belief that minority ownership promotes content diversity. 291
There, Congress had required the FCC to grant a preference to any applicant who
would further program diversity and award "an additional significant preference"
to minority controlled ownership groups.22 Finally, the Court pointed to the fact
that hearings were held on numerous bills to codify the minority policies when the
FCC began its inquiry on those policies, and although none of those bills were
adopted, Congress had expressed its intent by using its appropriations power to
ensure the continuation of the minority policies .293
The Court then considered several other issues which have frequently been addressed under the second prong of the various heightened scrutiny phraseologies.24 First, the belief of a nexus between minority ownership and content
diversity was not based on "impermissible stereotyping" but is similar to Justice
Powell's conclusion in Bakke that minority students would enhance the expression
of divergent viewpoints.29 Further, the Court noted that before instituting the minority ownership policies, the FCC had determined that efforts aimed at eliminating discriminatory employment practices in the broadcast industry had not
resulted in a significant number of minorities owning media outlets.296 The Court
also believed the minority ownership programs were not overly broad because
Congress can continually reevaluate the programs and eventually eliminate the
policies when their objectives have been achieved.297
The Court concluded by dismissing the claim that the FCC policies imposed
impermissible burdens on nonminorities. 2 98 Because "[n]o one has a First
Amendment right to a [broadcast] license,"299an applicant has "no settled expectation that their applications will be granted without consideration of public interest
factors such as minority ownership."300 In this regard, the Court also dismissed
Shurberg's claim that the distress sale imposed a greater burden than the comparative hearing enhancement because race was the only factor considered. 0 1 Justice
Brennan reasoned that because distress sales constitute only a small percentage of

290. Id. at 3013 (quoting Amend. to the Communications Act of 1934; Hearings on S. 2004 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 91 st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I at 642
(1969) (testimony of John McLaughlin)).
291. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3014-15. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A).
292. Id. at 3015 (quoting Section 115 of the Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-259, 96
Stat. 1094 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A))).
293. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3015-16. See also id. at 3006 n.9.
294. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct at 3016-27.
295. Id. at 3016-17 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313). See also id. at 3017 n.33.
296. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3021 (quoting Minority Ownership Statement, 68 F.C.C.2d at 980).
297. Id. at 3024-25.
298. Id. at 3025-27.
299. See Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
300. Id. at 3026.
301. Id. at 3026-27.
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all sales of broadcast facilities, the burden on nonminorities was no greater than
the ten percent minority set-aside approved by the Court in Fullilove.302
Justice Stevens filed an opinion in which he concurred with both the opinion
and judgement of the Court.303 However, he avoided any discussion of the level of
review and instead expressed the view that the future benefit of broadcast diversity
justified Congress' use of racial classifications.30 4
Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Kennedy,
issued a dissenting opinion.30 5 Justice O'Connor began by noting a distinction between constitutional theory and social science.306 Justice O'Connor believed that
while a link between background and behavior may be a proper subject of debate
for social scientists, the Constitution prohibits the government from allocating
"benefits and burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or eth30 7
nicity determines how they act or think."
Addressing the appropriate level of review, Justice O'Connor believed the
Court's opinion in Croson mandated that strict scrutiny be applied to the FCC minority policies .308 The dissenters believed that even though the government does
not routinely differentiate among citizens based on their race, the majority had
used a level of review no greater than the rational basis standard used for routine
legislation.30 9 Justice O'Connor also believed that the role of Congress in continuing the FCC policies did not warrant a lesser level of scrutiny because equal protection guarantees were no less binding against the federal government than the
states. 10 "[T]he respect due a coordinate branch yields neither less vigilance in
defense of equal protection principles nor any corresponding diminution of the
standard of review. "311
Justice O'Connor stated that the Court's holding in Fullilove was not dispositive
in the context of the programs at issue in the instant case. 312 Unlike the FCC policies, the set-asides reviewed in Fullilove involved an exercise of Congress' authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment which "empowers Congress to act

302. Id. at 3027. Justice Brennan also believed the distress sale did not impose undue burdens on nonminority
firms because such a firm could prevent the distress sale by filing an application to be considered along with a
current licensee's renewal application before the FCC calls a licensee's qualifications into question. Shurberg
had petitioned for a mutually exclusive comparative hearing after Faith Center's license had come into question.
Justice Brennan also reasoned that even though a nonminority firm may not anticipate which licensee's qualifications will come into question, the program is not unfair because in that situation, the nonminority has no expectations whatsoever of gaining a broadcast license. Id. n.5 1.
303. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3033 (Stevens, J., concurring).
304. Id.
305. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3028 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
306. Id. at 3029.
307. Id.
308. Id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 3030 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
311. Id. See also, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n. 16 (1987); Heckler v. Matthews, 465
U.S. 728 (1984); Weinburger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,638 n.2 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684-91 (1973).
312. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3031-32.
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respecting the States . . 313 The program in Fullilove required the states to re"concern
serve a portion of federal contracts for minorities while the FCC 31policies
4
only the administration offederal programsby federal officials."
The dissenters also believed the Fullilove analogy was inapposite because, unlike the MBE set-asides, the FCC programs were not remedial. Justice O'Connor
would have limited the holding of Fullilove to a remedial congressional program
because the Court had there stated that the MBE set-asides were upheld only "because Congress had identified discrimination that had particularly affected the
construction industry and had carefully constructed corresponding remedial measures. " 315 Where the government has identified actual discrimination, Justice
O'Connor believed that a compelling governmental interest arises to remedy its
present effects. 316 Because there was no evidence of discrimination in the allocation of broadcast licenses, Justice O'Connor considered it appropriate that the
FCC had conceded that its programs were not remedial in nature. 17
The dissenters also believed that the congressional action preventing the FCC
from reevaluating its minority policies could not be equated with the action in Fullilove as it was not a considered judgement resulting in a carefully tailored remedial program, but merely an endorsement of a policy to enhance broadcast
diversity. 31a Finally, even if the Court's decision in Fullilove applied to other than
remedial legislation adopted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, it
3 19 Juscould not support the majority's use of the intermediate standard of review.
tice O'Connor pointed out that six Justices had instead preferred to subject the
MBE provisions to some higher level of review.32 ° In Fullilove, the three Justices
comprising the plurality who had chosen not to apply strict scrutiny, still adhered
to the more stringent principle that a congressional program employing racial or
ethnic criteria must be subjected to "a most searching examination" and must be
"narrowly tailored to the" goal of "remedying the present effects of past discrimination. "321
Subjecting the FCC policies to a strict scrutiny test, the dissenters first determined that the goal of broadcast diversity was not a compelling governmental interest. 322 Citing Wygant, Justice O'Connor restated that generalized claims of past
discrimination are insufficient to provide the compelling governmental interest
necessary to impose race-conscious measures .323 "Like the vague assertion of so-

313. Id. at 3030.
314. Id. at 3030-31 (emphasis added).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 3033.
317. Id. at 3034.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 3031.
320. Id. at 3031. Only Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun had chosen to apply the intermediate level of
review.
321. Id. at 3032 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480, 491).
322. Id. at 3034-36 (emphasis added).
323. Id. at 3035 (quoting f4tant, 476 U.S. at 274, 276).
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cietal discrimination . .

.

.[broadcast diversity] is simply too amorphous, too in-

substantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing racial
classifications."324

The dissenters likewise found the second prong of the strict scrutiny test to be
unsatisfied as the program was not narrowly tailored. 32' First, because the means
employed "directly equate race with belief and behavior," they are premised on the
notion that racial differences are relevant in determining who should receive benefits, a premise "utterly irrational and repugnant to the principles of a free and democratic society." 326 Second, since the FCC had never determined whether there
were alternative means of achieving program diversity, it had not demonstrated
that the use of racial classifications were necessary.3 27 Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor believed the FCC policies ignored the degree to which the market
shapes programming because minority owners arejust as likely as other owners to
ignore their own preferences and choose programming based upon its ability to attract audiences.328

Finally, Justice O'Connor believed the FCC minority policies resulted in an unby
due burden on nonminorities 2 9 She believed a particular burden was imposed 33
the distress sale because "there is no more rigid quota than a 100% set-aside." 1
The dissenters were not convinced this burden was diminished by the small number of licenses exchanged in this manner because "it is no response to a person denied admission from one school, or discharged from one job, solely on the basis of
31
race, that other schools and employers do not discriminate."
Justices Kennedy and Scalia, although joining in Justice O'Connor's dissent,
wrote separately and delivered a particularly forceful dissent. 32 The Justices likened the majority's opinion to the Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson333 in which
it upheld racial classifications on the ground that they were "reasonable" and
"served the governmental interest of increasing the riding pleasure of railroad passengers."33 4 The "fundamental errors" in that case "distorted the law for six dec-

324. Id. at 3034-45.
325. Id. at 3036-44.
326. Id. at 3037 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 316).
327. Id. at 3040-41. The FCC Docket 86-484 inquiry, which had been halted before completion by the appropriations act, had sought answers to the following: "what race-neutral means might effectively increase program
diversity, whether it should require an individualized showing of ability to contribute to program diversity,
whether the FCC should allow nonminority members to demonstrate their ability to contribute to diverse programming, and whether the FCC should select applicants based on demonstrated commitment to particular issues rather than according to race." Id. at 3040.
328. Id. at 3041. Justice O'Connor further stated that the distress sale provision was particularly ill-equipped
to enhance diversity since it would allow even an absentee owner an opportunity to participate in the minority
policies. Id. at 3041-42.
329. Id. at 3043-44.
330. Id. at 3043. See also supra note 329 and accompanying text.
331. Id. at 3043.
332. Id. at 3044-47 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
333. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
334. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)).
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ades before the Court announced its apparent demise in Brown v. Board of
Education . . . ,,335 "Plessy's standard of review and its explication have disturbing parallels to today's majority opinion .... "1336
Justice Kennedy also took issue with the majority's reliance on Fullilove as precedence for its decision. He believed that even if the Court's approach in Fullilove
was valid, it did not support the FCC minority policies because they were not implemented for remedial purposes .~ Justice Kennedy concluded that he regretted
that the 100 years of constitutional interpretation since Plessy had done "no more
than move us from 'separate but equal' to 'unequal but benign.' "338
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Law After Metro Broadcasting
There is no reason to suspect that the Court's decision in Metro Broadcasting
has served to weaken its decisions in Crosonand ffgant. Those cases firmly establish that at least a majority of the Court will apply some form of strict scrutiny
and will be unwilling to find the necessary compelling governmental interest allowing the states and their governmental subunits to employ race-conscious measures without a factual predicate demonstrating "actual" instances of past
discrimination .33 However, without considering the impact of Justices Brennan's
and Marshall's retirement, Metro Broadcastingrepresents precedent significantly
expanding the power of Congress to use benign racial classifications.
The plain language of the Court's decision allows congressional use of a race
conscious measure for any purpose, so long as the program serves an "important"
governmental interest. 34' Further, the fact that the Court never questioned Congress' belief that broadcast diversity was an important governmental interest
would indicate that the Court will show substantial deference to whatever Congress determines to be an important governmental interest. Thus, because objectives other than remedying past discrimination will amount to a sufficient
governmental interest, the power of Congress to employ affirmative action now
surpasses even its broad remedial powers under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment and would seem to extend to any congressional power enumerated or implied
in the Constitution.341 The Court believed the legislative competence of Congress
as a national legislature warranted the Court's giving sanction to a significant ex-

335. Id. (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 3044-45.
338. Id. at 3047.
339. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3035 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 505; Wygant,
476 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment).
340. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3035.
341. See id. at 3010-11. The congressional action mandating the retention of the FCC minority policies was an
exercise of Congress' spending powers. SEE U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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pansion of congressional power."' However, in so ruling, the Court exceeded
even the most broad interpretations of its prior affirmative action decisions.
Although one cannot ignore that a particular Justice's views on affirmative
action are at least as much shaped by his or her political beliefs as his or her feelings on stare decisis, the majority's attempt to find precedent in Fullilove is misplaced. The congressionally mandated set-asides in Fullilove were upheld because
of Congress' remedial powers under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.343
Congress justified the MBE set-asides on the ground that the small percentage of
minorities being awarded federal public works projects perpetuated the effects of
industry-wide discrimination in the construction industry which other measures 3'" had failed to overcome. 3 " While one may legitimately question whether
Congress conclusively demonstrated the existence of discrimination in the construction industry,' and even some "conservative" members of the Court have
suggested that Congress "need not make specific findings of discrimination to engage in race-conscious relief. "4'Fullilove fails to provide precedent for the instant
case because no remedial purpose was even asserted.' 8 Instead, Congress insisted the FCC policies be maintained in order to enhance broadcast diversity."'
From this point, the majority commits a "two-prong" error by its reliance on Fullilove.
The majority first errs by its use of the intermediate scrutiny test, and follows
this by applying the test in such a manner that it fails to amount to a heightened
scrutiny analysis. Although, as Justice Brennan states, only three members of the
Court in Fullilove applied the traditional strict scrutiny test,35 0 three other Justices
believed the MBE provision should be subjected to a "most searching examination" and that such programs must be "narrowly tailored" to achieving a remedial
purpose.351 Thus, despite only three Justices requiring that a "compelling" governmental interest be demonstrated, the six Justices requiring that the program be
narrowly tailored would seem to prohibit the majority's reliance on Fullilove for
the imposition of such a wholesale lessening of the level of review.
The majority also erred by failing to confine itself to the literal language of the
intermediate scrutiny test which indicates that racial classifications may only be
used upon the showing of an "important" governmental interest and when the

342. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3009- 10.
343. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483. See also Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3031.
344. Unlike the situation in Fullilove, where Congress had attempted race neutral means of eradicating the effects of past discrimination, see supra note 150, the FCC had not attempted race neutral means of bringing about
greater minority ownership and was in fact in the process of eliminating some policies which were instituted to
bring about greater broadcast diversity. See infra notes 350-51 and accompanying text.
345. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-03 (opinion of Powell, J.).
at 536 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
346. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 529 n.9 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also id.
347. Croson, 488 U.S. at 489 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
348. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3010.
349. Id.
350. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3008.
448 U.S. at 491.
351. Fullilove,
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means employed are "substantially" related to accomplishing that important governmental objective. While the intermediate test as stated provides a framework
for a heightened scrutiny analysis, the majority's failure to address several factors
worthy of its attention caused its application of that test to amount to nothing more
than a two part rational basis examination.
The Court merely assumed that Congress and the FCC were correct in their
conclusion that broadcast diversity was an important governmental interest. In so
doing, it failed to note that at the same time broadcast diversity was being promoted as a sufficiently important government interest to justify the use of racial
declassifications, the FCC was engaged in a series of deregulatory measures
35 2
signed to let the market have a greater influence on programming choices.

Of

particular noteworthiness was the alteration of its multiple ownership rule, in
which the maximum number of broadcast facilities a single person or entity could
This is certainly inconsistent with the
own was increased from seven to twelve.
than
the demands of individual broadcast
rather
claim that diffusion of ownership,
markets, would enhance broadcast diversity.
Unlike the test applied by Justice O'Connor and the Chief Justice in which a sufficient governmental interest to employ racial classifications can only be demonstrated by showing the need to remedy the effects of past discrimination, 3 the
majority's opinion indicates that any interest that Congress concludes is "important" may be accomplished through the use of race-conscious measures. This
clearly exceeds the Court's ruling in Fullilove which was based on the "positive
grant" of remedial power given Congress by section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.355
In its application of the second prong of the intermediate test, the majority
again did no more than examine whether there was a rationale basis for Congress
to conclude that the means employed would enhance broadcast content. Neither
Congress nor the FCC had ever demonstrated any correlation between content diversity and minority ownership. 5 In fact, the Chairman of the FCC had stated
while testifying before Congress that the agency possessed no such knowledge.
To the extent that heightened scrutiny requires certain factual predicates, we discovered notwithstanding our statements in the past regarding the assumed nexus be-

tween minority and female ownership and diversity, a factual predicate has never
been established.
For example, the Commission has at no time examined whether there is a nexus
between a broadcast owner's race or gender and program diversity on either a case

352. See Comment, The Public Interest, Convenience, or Necessity: A Dead Standard in the Era of Broadcast
Deregulation?, 10 PACE L. REv.661, 678-85 (1990).
353. See Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 18 (1984).
dissenting).
354. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3034 (O'Connor, J.,
355. See Fullilove, 488 U.S. at 476.
356. The FCC had of course, attempted to do so, but Congress forbade it from any further examination of its
minority policies. See supra notes 32, 272 and accompanying text.
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by case basis or generally. We had no reason to because the court in TV 9 told us we
could, indeed must assume such a nexus."5 7

The Court failed to address how if, with its expertise in the area of broadcast regulation, the FCC could not unequivocally assure Congress that such a nexus existed, that Congress, in the context of an appropriations bill,58 could have
conclusively demonstrated such a nexus.
While the Court discussed the issues traditionally addressed under the "narrowly tailored" prong of the strict scrutiny test, it again ignored important factors
which merited attention. 59 The majority claimed that the minority policies were
justified because previous policies had failed to achieve the desired content diversity.36" This argument is fallacious because, as the chairman's quote indicates, the
FCC had never determined that the use of racial classifications would contribute
to broadcast diversity," 1 and because those previous policies were being eliminated in order to allow market demands to greater influence programming decisions .

By dismissing the claim that the program impermissibly burdened nonminorities by explaining that no prospective licensee has the expectation of being
awarded a broadcast license without "public interest factors" being considered,36 3
the majority demonstrates that it failed to consider the significance of the minority
enhancement in the comparative hearing process. At the time the case was heard,
fifty-one of the seventy-eight most recent comparative hearings had resulted in the
broadcast licenses being awarded to minority or female applicants. 64 Thus, the
comparative hearing enhancement effectively amounted to a sixty-five percent
set-aside. Further, as is pointed out by Justice O'Connor, the distress sale policy
amounts to a 100 percent set-aside because race is the only criterion which qualifies one for participation in the program. 6 5 These statistics indicate the FCC minority programs are overwhelmingly more impactive than the ten percent MBE
set-aside in Fulilove366 and even greater than the thirty percent MBE provision
struck down in Croson.3 7

357. Minority Owned Broadcast Stations, Hearing on H.R. 5373 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 2d
Sess. 16 (1986). See also Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3042 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
358. See supra note 32.
359. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3019-27. The two most prominent issues addressed under the second prong of the strict scrutiny test are whether alternatives to race conscious measures were available to achieve
the desired governmental interest and whether the minority preference impermissibly burdens nonminorities.
360. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3021.
361. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 350-51 and accompanying text.
363. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 2036.
364. Brief for Metro Broadcasting, Inc. at 23 and n.23.
365. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3043 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
366. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454.
367. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
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The Court's decision in Bakke, although a somewhat natural comparison because in each case the claimed governmental interest was diversity,388 also fails to
provide precedent for the FCC policies. This is because there is an important distinction between the likely benefit to first amendment values 369 to be achieved by a
diverse student body and diversity among owners of broadcast outlets. It is much
more logical to conclude that racial minorities would more greatly contribute to
the "robust exchange of ideas" 370 in a classroom than as owners of broadcast outlets
because of the financial realities involved in operation of a broadcast facility. For
a minority owner to successfully operate a broadcast facility by choosing programming perceived to appeal primarily to minorities, it would necessarily require a large percentage of minorities in the viewing area. In this situation, a
minority owner is not likely to contribute significantly to diversity because other
broadcasters, both minority and nonminority, would likewise attempt to capture
such audiences 71
Just as the majority opinion ignores factors which the Court should consider to
determine if the government has justified its use of even benign race-conscious
measures, the particularly hard-line positions taken by Justices Kennedy and Scalia 372 are also out of step with the Court's precedent as it fails to recognize the devastating present effects of past discrimination endured by some minority groups.
Each of the Court's prior decisions in this area, although the Justices have employed different phraseology, has established that a limited use of racial criteria is
constitutionally permissible upon a showing that such is necessary to achieve a
substantial governmental interest.373 This is essentially the position of Justice

368. Despite the stated differences, both Bakke and Metro Broadcasting are each premised on the notion that
one's race is relevant in determining one's behavior. The Chief Justice, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy have all indicated that they would not vote to sanction a program which rests on this premise under any
circumstances. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
Kennedy, J., and Scalia, J.)).
369. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13. Justice Powell believed that the furtherance of first amendment values presented a "countervailing constitutional interest" which supported the University's goal of obtaining a more diverse student body. Id.
370. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.).
371. The effect of minority broadcasters on broadcast content diversity is still subject to debate and has not
received universal acceptance by the courts. While the majority acknowledges the existence of such a nexus,
Justice O'Connor believed that such an assumption rests on impermissible racial stereotypes. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3029. Justice O'Connor also believed that minority viewpoints were less effectively conveyed
from a broadcaster than students in a classroom because most persons in the viewing audience are unaware of the
race of a particular broadcaster. Id. at 3041. This issue was thoughtfully and thoroughly discussed by Judge
Williams in Winter Park Communications v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (companion case to Metro
Broadcasting's appeal in the court below). Judge Williams would have first required the FCC to offer an "empirically verifiable" definition of minority programming. Id. at 358. He would have next required Congress to demonstrate that there was a nexus between ownership and broadcast content. Id. Judge Williams rejected a
Congressional Research Service Report, Minority Broadcast Station Ownership and BroadcastProgramming:Is
There a Nexus ? (June 29, 1988) because although it showed that minority owners saidthey offered programming
purposefully aimed at attracting minorities more than did nonminority owners, the report did not verify that they
actually did so, and more importantly, did not take into account the percentages of minorities in the viewing area
of the surveyed owners. Id. at 359.
372. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3044-47 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
373. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 221; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 285; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480; Bakke, 438 U.S. at
305.
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O'Connor and the Chief Justice who reiterated in Metro Broadcasting that raceconscious measures are permissible when "narrowly tailored" to achieve a remedial purpose.374
Indeed, an appropriate governmental authority should be entitled to take affirmative measures to ensure that past violations of equal protection are not perpetuated from one generation to the next. Providing a remedy for a violation of so
basic a right as equal protection under the law is the essence of a compelling governmental interest. However, the Court has a duty to see that such programs are
truly remedial as opposed to benefits gained as the result of political coalitions
which fail to address the plight of some disadvantaged groups."7 ' When reviewing
an affirmative action program, the Court should demonstrate awareness that even
programs based on proper motives may not only fail to address the disadvantages
of less well represented groups who are not singled out for preferential treatment
but may also unfairly force others, though not "disadvantaged," to bear an unfair
share of the burden imposed by such programs. a76 These concerns should lead the
Court to apply strict scrutiny to all affirmative action programs to ensure that both
a remedial justification has been demonstrated and that the program is narrowly
tailored so as to limit the burdens it imposes on persons who are not the recipients
of the program's benefits.
In Metro Broadcasting, however, a majority of the Court upheld a program
based not on a desire to remedy past discrimination, but a program with a suspect 377 purpose and a total absence of procedural safeguards.378 In the current political climate that has seen the rise of politicians such as Louisiana's David Duke,
at least partly due to the beliefs of "discrete and insular" whites that their economic
difficulties are related to affirmative action programs and civil rights legisla-

374. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3031 (opinion of O'Connor, J., dissenting).
375. See, e.g., Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985). The author argues that
the "diffuse character of the majority" and the pluralistic nature of American politics provides powerful voting
blocks for groups otherwise considered "discrete and insular." Id. at 728.
376. The extent to which many of those burdened by affirmative action programs are not well represented by
the political body that imposes them is addressed by Van Alstyne, Rights of Passage:Race, the Supreme Court,
and the Constitution, 46 U. CH. L. REV. 775 (1979).
[Tihe majority of the medical school faculty [that implemented the admissions program] were themselves not likely to have been "representatives" of the Allan Bakkes, that is, reasonably good, but not
among the best medical school applicants. If we should assume anything about that faculty. . . we might
more safely assume that the faculty "represented" not persons in Bakke's position at all but only outstanding students, persons who do especially well in academic life, who do equally well through medical
school, and who are thus sufficiently outstanding to have been granted academic appointments in a great
university.
Id. at 801-02.
377. See supra notes 350-60 and accompanying text.
378. There is substantial evidence that the FCC programs are being abused. For instance, Astroline Communications Company, the distress sale beneficiary in Metro Broadcastinghad a total capitalization of $24,000,000.
Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3047 n.3 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Its only minority participant was a hispanic-American who despite having seventy-one percent of its voting equity, had made a total cash contribution
of $210. The FCC policies also became an issue in the 1990 North Carolina Senate contest when Senator Jesse
Helms revealed that his African-American opponent had been the recipient of a broadcast license under the minority policies but had soon sold his interest at a substantial profit.
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tion,379 the Supreme Court would do well to delineate a standard which requires a
governmental body, including Congress, to demonstrate a remedial purpose 380 and
to provide safeguards which assure that the program will not be abused by those
who attempt to gain a windfall in the name of eradicating discrimination. In this
regard, Justice Marshall's statement that "unfairness ought not be confused with
constitutional injury" 38 1 is inapposite at best.
B. The CourtAfter Metro Broadcasting
No analysis on the impact of Metro Broadcastingon affirmative action would be
complete without considering the substantial impact Justice Brennan's retirement
will have on the Court.3 82 It would be hard to imagine that Justice Souter, who has
replaced Justice Brennan on the Court, will be often aligned with the Court's "liberal" wing, much less its driving force. Not only will that wing on the Court lose
one of its most consistent votes, it will also be without the Justice who was the
most effective at building the necessary consensus among the Justices to assure
that its judicial agenda went forward. 3' Affirmative action could likely be one of
the first areas of law to reflect the viewpoints and agendas of the current Justices.
The current members of the Court can be placed into three loosely divided
camps - those who believe affirmative action is permissible in almost any context,
those who believe it is appropriate under certain circumstances, and those who believe that there is almost no context in which it deserves the Court's sanction.
The first group, following Justice Brennan's departure, now consists of only
Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Neither of these Justices has ever voted to sustain a challenge to any affirmative action plan before the Court. Other than Justice
Brennan, they were the only Justices who voted to uphold the plan challenged in
Croson in which a city council controlled by minorities enacted an affirmative

379. The Civil Rights Act of 1990, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. (1990). Although the Act was passed by Congress, it
was vetoed by President Bush who believed the bill would require the use of racial quotas by employers.
380. Whether the program is actually enacted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment is of questionable significance. The focus should be centered on whether the program, regardless of the congressional powers
cited as providing authority, is truly a remedial program which addresses identified discrimination. If the Court
views the program as being remedial, it seems willing to cite section 5 regardless of whether Congress itself
choose to do so. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475 (stating that the set-aside, although enacted pursuant to Congress'
spending powers, could be upheld if it could have been enacted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment).
381. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 296 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
382. The February 1991 issue of the A.B.A. Journal contains two articles which review Justice Brennan's tenure on the Court. See Tribe, Justice William J. BrennanJr., Architect of the Bill of Rights, 77 A.B.A. J., Feb.
1991, at 47; The BrennanLegacy, A Roundtable Discussion, 77 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 52 (featuring a discussion ofJustice Brennan's impact on the Court by scholars Bruce Fein, Rex Lee, Jesse Chopper, Dick Howard, and
Burt Neuborne) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion]. The issue also contains an interview with Justice Brennan.
Stewart, A Life on the Court, 77 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 62.
383. See Stewart, The Great Persuader,76 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1990, at 58. See also Tribe, supra note 382, at 51.
Justice Marshall states that Justice Brennan was always willing to alter "a paragraph here or recast a thought there
to accommodate his colleagues concerns." Id. Professor Jesse Chopper suggests that the "congressional mandate" language ofMetro Broadcastingis an example of such consensus building as it enabled him to secure the vote
of Justice White. See, A Roundtable Discussion, supra note 382 at 53. "[lit didn't make the least bit of difference
to Justice Brennan whether it was enacted by Congress or not - he would have approved it in any event." Id.
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action plan.384 Their votes in that case would indicate that there are very few circumstances under which Justices Marshall and Blackmun would find an affirmative action program to deny nonminorities the principles of equal protection
contained in the fifth or fourteenth amendment.
The views of the second group are best examined by dividing them into two
subgroups. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, although having never
voted to uphold an affirmative action program,38 have indicated that there are certain circumstances under which they may be willing to do so.38 However, both
believe that strict scrutiny should be applied to any racial classification, whether it
is enacted by Congress or the States. 387 Regarding race-conscious measures employed by Congress, Justice O'Connor has, at least in dicta, offered support for the
Fullilove rationale that Congress is given broad remedial powers by section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment which would allow it to employ a limited use of racial criteria to effectuate a remedial objective.38 The position of the Chief Justice on this
issue is, however, manifestly unclear. Although he joined all parts of Justice
O'Connor's opinions in Metro Broadcasting"9 and Croson, 39' he was among the
dissenters in Fullilove.39 1 In that case, he joined an opinion in which Justice Stewart stated that "if a law is unconstitutional, it is no less unconstitutional just because it is a product of the Congress of the United States."3 92 Regarding the use of
race-conscious measures by the states, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor will apply strict scrutiny and will only find the necessary compelling governmental interest when "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings" have
demonstrated instances of actual discrimination .33
The two Justices who comprise the second subgroup, Justices Stevens and
White, are also the Justices whose votes are the most difficult to forecast. Neither
Justice has aligned himself with a particular standard of review or articulated a
concise rationale. Justice Stevens has been particularly unpredictable394 because
of his belief that, rather than looking to the past to find a basis for disparate treatment, the Court's inquiry should focus on the future benefit to be achieved by the

384. See Croson 488 U.S. at 497.
385. This fact may indicate that there is a greater significance to the level of review than is indicated by the
language of their opinions. While Justice O'Connor has always, and the Chief Justice beginning with 4ygant has
chosen to address the particular program before the Court, as oppossed to affirmative action in general, the application of strict scrutiny could also be considered a convenient method of applying a colorblind interpretation of
the Constitution.
386. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3030 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 497.
387. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
388. See id. at 3030. Justice O'Connor states that "Congress has considerable latitude, presenting special concerns for judicial review, when it exercises its 'unique remedial powers. . . under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 490) (emphasis added).
389. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3028.
390. Croson, 488 U.S. at 476.
391. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 522.
392. Id. at 526-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
393. Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
394. While Justice Stevens voted to uphold the affirmative action programs in Metro Broadcastingand W5gant,
he voted against upholding the programs in Bakke, Fullilove, and Croson.
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use of racial classifications."' 5 He has not, however, set forth a methodology by
which the Court may distinguish between an affirmative action program which
provides a sufficient future benefit to justify the use of racial classifications and
one which does not.
Justice White appears to believe that affirmative action implicates the doctrine
of federalism to the same extent as equal protection because he has only consistently voted to uphold those plans which were implemented by Congress. In this
area, Justice White does not appear to perceive a distinction between legislation
adopted as a remedial measure and those enacted to accomplish other federal objectives.396 Although Justice White voted to uphold the admissions program in
Bakke, 97 his votes in Wygant 98 and Croson3 99 indicate that he is not at present
likely to approve of any plan not mandated by Congress .40'
The final group consists of Justices Kennedy and Scalia, each of whom has issued or joined forceful opinions against affirmative action in both cases addressing the issue during their tenure on the Court.4" 1 Justice Scalia believes the
fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from using race-conscious measures unless it can show the classification is necessary to remedy its own practice of invidious discrimination."' Although Justice Scalia has recognized in dicta that
differences exist between Congress and smaller political bodies,40 ' the tone of his
opinions indicates that he would only be willing to approve an affirmative program that was adopted in response to a unique circumstance and pursuant to Congress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. This quote from
Croson is indicative of the tone of his opinions in this area:
[T]hose who believe that racial preferences can help to "even the score" display, and
reinforce, a manner of thinking by race that was the source of the [original] injustice
and that will, if it endures within our society, be the source of more injustice still.
The relevant proposition is not that it was blacks, or Jews, or Irish who were discriminated against, but that it was individual men and women, "created equal," who
were discriminated against. And the relevant resolve is that [it] should never happen
again. Racial preferences appear to "even the score" (in some small degree) only if
one embraces the proposition that our society is appropriately viewed as divided into

395. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 513 n.2, 3.
0 2
396. CompareMetro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 30 2- 8; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at453. Justice Whitejoined the
section 5 rationale of Justice Burger in Fullilove, but also joined the competence of Congress rationale of Justice
Brennan in Metro Broadcasting.
397. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-79. Justice White was among the Justices known as the "Brennan group."
398. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 212-32 and accompanying text.
400. See Stewart, White to the Right?, 76 A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 40 (the author concludes that while Justice
White is now perceived to be more closely aligned with the conservative wing of the Court, he still consistently
votes to uphold congressional legislation and takes a broad view of the powers of the federal government in general).
401. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3044-47 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Scalia); Croson, 488 U.S. at 518-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 488 U.S. at 520-528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
402. Croson, 488 U.S. at 524 (opinion of Scalia, J., concurring).
403. Id. at 543.
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races, making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should be
compensated for by discriminating against a white.40 4
Justice Kennedy seems no more inclined than Justice Scalia to accept affirmative action as the routine remedial response to the present effects of past discrimination. Justice Kennedy likened the Court's opinion in Metro Broadcastingto its
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson"' and has spoken of the "stigma imposed by racial
preferences" 4 6 on those they benefit and the "animosity and discontent they create"40 7 among those who are excluded from participation in the programs. Justice
Kennedy has also made apparent his belief that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment does not afford Congress special powers to employ racial classifications. In
this regard, he expressly refused to join that part of Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Croson addressing the powers of Congress to implement affirmative action
plans 408 and has stated that he fails to see how a law enacted by Congress can be an
"equal protection guarantee" 40 9 while the same law, if enacted by a state, would violate principles of equal protection.410
While predicting how a Justice will vote on any given case is an inexact science
at best, a close reading of the Justices' opinions in this area reveals that the Court
will certainly not give its sanction to an expanded use of affirmative action in the
near future, and may be inclined to limit its five-to-four decision in Metro Broadcasting. The most likely modification of Metro Broadcasting would be for the
Court to limit congressional use of racial classification to only those programs
which are remedial measures enacted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. However, because three members of the Court411 are apparently satisfied with the intermediate level of scrutiny for congressional programs, and the
two "conservative" Justices 412 who might vote for such a program believe all racial
classifications should be subjected to strict scrutiny, a decision upholding the program would likely prevent the emergence of a precise standard by which future
programs could be judged.
Since the Croson majority regarding state employed affirmative action plans
seemingly remains intact, Justice Souter's greatest potential impact is in bolstering
the efforts of the "conservative" wing of the Court to limit the use of affirmative
action by Congress. While he would likely be part of a majority of the Court who
are willing to confine congressional affirmative action programs to section 5 re-

404. Id. at 527-28.
405. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3046 (opinion of Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), upholding "separate but equal" treatment for whites and nonwhites).
406. Id. at 3047.
407. Id.
408. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 520.
409. Id. at 518.
410. Id.
411. Justices Blackmun, White, and Stevens.
412. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. See supra notes 382-88 regarding the likelihood the Chief
Justice might vote to uphold a congressional affirmative action plan.
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medial measures and apply strict scrutiny,413 it is unlikely that a majority of the
Court will produce a result confining Congress to the same extent that Croson did
the States, regardless of Justice Souter's views.414 In addition to the four remaining Justices in the Metro Broadcastingmajority, Justice O'Connor appears disinclined to completely eliminate the ability of Congress to employ benign
race-conscious measures. Although in dicta, Justice O'Connor has explicitly
4 16 that Congress possesses
stated in both Croson41 5 and Metro Broadcasting
"unique remedial powers" under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.4 7 This
viewpoint, along with those of Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and White,
may very well assure that at least some of the principles annunciated in Justice
Brennan's last opinion on affirmative action may outlive his tenure on the Court.
VI. CONCLUSION

The legal and political debate over affirmative action will likely continue to intensify regardless of the path the Court chooses to follow in the future. At least for
a short while following its decision in Metro Broadcasting, the Court had finally
agreed on a level of review to be employed when reviewing race-conscious measures implemented by Congress. However, in light of Justice Brennan's retirement
from the Court soon thereafter, affirmative action is again an area of law ripe for
transition. Thus, the extent to which Metro Broadcastingwill remain a major victory for affirmative action proponents is uncertain. It is however, a victory that
they should savor, because it may be a long time before they find victory lane
again.
Neil A. Mabry©

413. As was the focus of much media attention during Justice Souter's confirmation process, his "paper trail" is
particularly unrevealing of his viewpoints on most major issues, affirmative action being no exception. During
his confirmation hearings, he did however, remark that the Court's current application of the intermediate test
appears closer to the rational basis test than to a traditional heightened scrutinyanalysis. See Report of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, The Nomination of David Souter to the Supreme Court, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990) (available on Microfiche at Y 1.1/6:101-32).
414. Assuming a plan enacted pursuant to section 5, the most likely result would be a Bakke-like decision with
three Justices, see supra note 411, applying the intermediate test, Justice O'Connor and perhaps the Chief Justice
upholding the program applying strict scrutiny in an analysis similar to Justice Powell's opinion in Fullilove, and
Justices Kennedy and Scalia holding that the program could not pass the strict scrutiny test. Under this scenario,
a majority could not be formed, regardless of Justice Souter's position, to go beyond limiting Congress to section
5 remedial measures, and applying strict scrutiny. Assuming a non-remedial program as in Metro Broadcasting,
Justice Souter would most likely join the Metro Broadcastingdissenters to form a majority which sustained a challenge to its constitutionality, but which fails to conclusively decide whether Congress may enact affirmative
action plans under section 5.
415. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-92.
416. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3030.
417. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 490).

